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Abstract
In Part I of this series of papers, we have proposed a new logic-based planning language, called
K. This language facilitates the description of transitions between states of knowledge and it is well
suited for planning under incomplete knowledge. Nonetheless, K also supports the representation of
transitions between states of the world (i.e., states of complete knowledge) as a special case, proving
to be very flexible. In the present Part II, we describe the DLVK planning system, which implementsK
on top of the disjunctive logic programming system DLV. This novel planning system allows for solv-
ing hard planning problems, including secure planning under incomplete initial states (often called
conformant planning in the literature), which cannot be solved at all by other logic-based planning
systems such as traditional satisfiability planners. We present a detailed comparison of the DLVK sys-
tem to several state-of-the-art conformant planning systems, both at the level of system features and
on benchmark problems. Our results indicate that, thanks to the power of knowledge-state problem
encoding, the DLVK system is competitive even with special purpose conformant planning systems,
and it often supplies a more natural and simple representation of the planning problems.
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1. Introduction
The need for modeling the behavior of robots in a formal way led to the definition of
logic-based languages for reasoning about actions and planning, such as [13,16–18,20,21,
26,33,45]. These languages allow for specifying planning problems of the form “Find a
sequence of actions that leads from an initial state to a goal state”.
A state is characterized by the truth values of a number of fluents, describing relevant
properties of the domain of discourse. An action is applicable only if some preconditions
(formulas over the fluents) hold in the current state; executing this action changes the
current state by modifying the truth values of some fluents. Most of these languages are
based on extensions of classical logics and describe transitions between possible states of
the world where every fluent necessarily is either true or false. However, robots usually do
not have a complete view of the world. Even if their knowledge is incomplete (a number
of fluents may be unknown, e.g., whether a door in front of the robot is open), they must
take decisions, execute actions, and reason on the basis of their (incomplete) information at
hand. For example, if it is not known whether a door is open, the robot might do a sensing
action, or decide to push back.
In [5,6], we have proposed a new language, K (where K should remind of states of
knowledge) for planning under incomplete knowledge. This language is very flexible, and
is capable of modeling transitions between states of the world (i.e., states of complete
knowledge) and reasoning about them as a particular case. Compared to similar planning
languages, in particular Giunchiglia and Lifschitz’ action language C [17,26,29], K is
closer in spirit to answer set semantics [12] than to classical logics. It supports the
explicit use of default negation, and thus exploiting the power of answer sets to deal with
incomplete knowledge. In [6] we have defined the syntax and semantics of K, discussed
how it can be used for knowledge representation, plus we have analyzed the computational
complexity of planning in K.
In the present paper, which is Part II of this series of papers, we turn to the
DLVK planning system, which implements K on top of the DLV answer set program-
ming system [7,9]. DLVK is a powerful planning system, which is freely available at
<URL:http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/> and ready-to-use for experiments. In com-
parison to similar logic-based planning systems like CCALC [30,31], CPlan [10,15], or
CMBP [4] DLVK has the following key features:
• Explicit background knowledge: The planning domain has a background (represented
by a stratified Datalog program) which describes static predicates.
• Type declarations: The arguments of changeable predicates, called fluents, and action
atoms are typed.
• Strong and weak negation: The DLVK system provides two kinds of negation familiar
from answer set semantics, namely weak (or default) negation “not” and strong (or
classical) negation “¬”, also denoted by “–”. Weak negation allows for a simple and
intuitive statement of inertia rules for fluents, or for the statement of default values for
fluents in the domain.
• Complete and incomplete states: By default, states in DLVK are consistent sets of
ground literals, in which not every atom must appear, and thus represent states
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of knowledge. However, by suitable constructs, DLVK also allows for representing
transitions between possible states of the world (which can be seen as states of
complete knowledge).
• Parallel/Sequential execution of actions: Simultaneous execution of actions is possi-
ble, and in fact the default mode. All actions to be executed must qualify through an
executability condition. Mutual exclusion of actions can be enforced in a sequential
planning mode.
• Secure (conformant) planning: DLVK is able to compute secure plans (often called
conformant plans in the literature [19,42]). Informally, a plan is secure, if it is
applicable starting at any legal initial state and enforces the goal, regardless of how
the state evolves. Using this feature, we can also model possible-worlds planning with
an incomplete initial state, where the initial world is only partially known, and we are
looking for a plan reaching the desired goal from every possible world according to
the initial state.
Main contributions. The main contributions of the present paper are the following:
(1) We reduce planning in K to answer set programming by means of an efficient
transformation. Using this transformation, a planning problem inK is translated into an
“equivalent” disjunctive logic program, which is then submitted to DLV for evaluation.
The solutions of the original planning problem are obtained from the answer sets
produced by DLV, which correspond to the optimistic plans. The use of disjunctive
rules in the transformation, which we use for natural problem modeling, can be easily
eliminated by using unstratified negation instead, and thus an adapted transformation
can be implemented on systems such as Smodels [35].
(2) We discuss the issue of secure planning, alias conformant planning and its realization
in the DLVK system. Briefly, the system imposes a “security check” on optimistic plans
in order to assess whether a plan is secure or not, which is transformed to a nested
call to DLV itself. By the foundational results in [6], finding a secure plan is a P3 -
hard1 problem, and such a two-step approach for secure planning (that is, first find an
optimistic plan and then check its security) is mandatory under polynomial reductions
to answer set programming, since DLV can only solve problems with complexity in P2
with polynomial overhead.
(3) We compare DLVK with the following state-of-the-art (conformant) planning systems:
CCALC [30,31], CMBP [4], CPlan [10,15], GPT [3], and SGP [47].
In particular, we first provide an overview of these systems comparing their main
features. We then consider a number of benchmark problems, namely problems in
the blocksworld and “bomb in the toilet” domains, and discuss their encodings in the
different systems from the viewpoint of knowledge representation. Having conducted
extensive experimentation, we report the execution times of the systems on a number of
1 We use the common notion where P2 describes the class of problems solvable in polynomial time by a
nondeterministic Turing machine using an NP oracle, whereas P3 is the respectively problem class solvable
polynomially by a nondeterministic Turing machine using a P2 oracle, and so on (cf. [36]).
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planning-problem instances and compare the performance of the systems. As it turns
out, thanks to the power of knowledge-state problem encodings DLVK can compete
even with special purpose conformant planning systems in the experiments, and it
often supplies a more elegant and succinct representation of the planning problems.
This may be taken as promising evidence for the potential usefulness of knowledge-
state problem encodings for conformant planning.
To the best of our knowledge, DLVK is the first declarative logic-programming based
planning system which allows solving P2 -hard planning problems like planning under
incomplete initial states.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we introduce
the DLVK planning system at the user and system architecture levels. After that, we turn
to the technical realization of DLVK, and discuss in Sections 3 and 4 the transformation of
DLVK planning problems to answer set programs, where the former section is devoted to
optimistic planning and the latter considers secure planning. After that, we compare the
DLVK planning system to a number of other planning systems. Section 6 discusses further
related work and presents an outlook to ongoing and future work.
In order to alleviate reading, relevant definitions and notation from the foundational
Part I [6] are provided in Appendix A of the present paper.
2. The planning system DLVK
In this section, we describe the DLVK planning system, which provides an imple-
mentation of the language K as a front-end of the DLV system [7,9]. We first describe
how planning problems are specified in DLVK, followed by the architecture of the sys-
tem, and finally briefly the usage of DLVK. In order not to be abundant, we shall re-
strict ourselves to a short exposition in which we focus on the essential facts. Fur-
ther information can be found in the foundational paper [6] or on the DLVK web page
<URL:http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/K/>.
2.1. Planning problems in DLVK
In this section, we describe how planning problems can be represented as “programs”
in the DLVK system. For this purpose, we shall consider an example in the well-known
blocksworld domain. DLVK programs are built using statements of the language K, plus
further optional control statements. We shall not exhaustively repeat all details of K here,
and in particular we shall not formally define the semantics ofK. The details and the formal
definition of the semantics ofK, which we include in abbreviated form in Appendix A, can
be found in [6].
A planning problem is a pair P = 〈PD, q〉 of a planning domain (informally, the
world of discourse) PD and a query q , which specifies the goal. A planning problem is
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represented as a combination of a background knowledge Π, which is a stratified Datalog
program (cf. Section 3.1), and a program of the following general form:
fluents: FD
actions: AD
initially: IR
always: CR
goal: q
where the sections fluents through always are optional and may be omitted. They
consist of statements, described below, each of which is terminated by “.”. Together
with the background knowledge Π, they specify a K planning domain of form PD =
〈Π, 〈D,R〉〉 (see Appendix A), where the declarations D are given by FD and ADand
the rules R by IR and CR .
The statements in FD and AD are fluent and action declarations, respectively, which
type the fluents and actions with respect to the (static) background predicates. They have
the form
p(X1, . . . ,Xn) requires t1, . . . , tm (1)
where p is a fluent or action predicate of arity n 0, and the ti are classical literals, i.e.,
an atom α or its negation ¬α (also denoted −α), over the predicates from the background
knowledge, such that every variable Xi occurs in t1, . . . , tm (as common, upper case letters
denote variables). Only ground instances of fluents and actions which are “supported”
by some ground instance of a declaration, i.e., the requires part is true, need to be
considered.
The initially-section specifies conditions that hold in an initial state (note that, in
general, the initial state may not be unique). They have the form of causal rules, which are
described next, without the after part.
The always-section specifies the dynamics of the planning domain in terms of
causation rules of the form
caused f if b1, . . . , bk, not bk+1, . . . , not bl
after a1, . . . , am, not am+1, . . . , not an (2)
where f is either a classical literal over a fluent or false (representing absurdity), the
bi ’s are classical literals over fluents and background predicates, and the aj ’s are positive
action atoms or classical literals over fluent and background predicates. Informally, the
rule (2) states that f is true in the new state reached by executing (simultaneously) some
actions, provided that the condition of the after part is true with respect to the old state
and the actions executed on it, and the condition of the if part is true in the new state.
Both the if- and after-parts are optional. Specifically, both can be omitted together
with the caused-keyword to represent simple facts.
The always-section also contains executability conditions for actions, i.e., expressions
of the form
executable a if b1, . . . , bk, not bk+1, . . . , not bl (3)
162 T. Eiter et al. / Artificial Intelligence 144 (2003) 157–211
Fig. 1. Sussman’s blocksworld planning problem.
fluents : on(B,L) requires block(B), location(L).
occupied(B) requires location(B).
actions : move(B,L) requires block(B), location(L).
initially : on(a,table). on(b,table). on(c,a).
always : caused occupied(B) if on(B1,B), block(B).
executable move(B,L) if B<> L.
nonexecutable move(B,L) if occupied(B).
nonexecutable move(B,L) if occupied(L).
noConcurrency.
caused on(B,L) after move(B,L).
caused -on(B,L1) after move(B,L), on(B,L1), L<> L1.
inertial on(B,L).
goal : on(c,b), on(b,a), on(a,table) ? (3)
Fig. 2. DLVK program for Sussman’s problem in the blocksworld domain PDbw .
where a is an action atom and b1, . . . , bl are classical literals. Informally, such a condition
says that a (well-typed) action is eligible for execution in a state, if b1, . . . , bk are known
to hold while bk+1, . . . , bl are not known to hold in that state.
The goal-section, finally, specifies the goal to be reached, and has the form
g1, . . . , gm,not gm+1, . . . ,not gn ? (i) (4)
where g1, . . . , gn are ground fluent literals, nm 0, and i  0 is the number of steps in
which the plan must reach the goal.
All rules in IR and CR have to satisfy the safety requirement for default negated type
literals,2 i.e., each variable occurring in a default negated type literal has to occur in at
least one non-negated type literal or dynamic literal. Note that this safety restriction does
not apply to action and fluent literals whose variables are already range restricted by the
respective declarations.
Example 2.1 (Sussman’s blocksworld planning problem). An example of a DLVK program
is given in Fig. 2. It represents Sussman’s famous planning problem in the blocksworld
domain [44], depicted in Fig. 1, by which he showed anomalous behavior of STRIPS
planning.
The blocksworld planning domain PDbw involves distinguishable blocks and a table.
Blocks and the table can serve as locations on which other blocks can be put (a block
2 These are literals corresponding to predicates defined in the background knowledge.
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can hold at most one other block, while the table can hold arbitrarily many blocks).
The background knowledge Πbw thus has predicates block and location defined as
follows:
block(a). block(b). block(c).
location(table).
location(B) :- block(B).
In the DLVK program, two fluents are declared for representing states: on(B,L), which
states that some block B resides on some location L, and occupied(L), which is true
for a location L, if its capacity of holding blocks is exhausted. Furthermore, there is a single
action predicate move(B,L), which represents moving a block B to some location L (and
implicitly removes that block from its previous location).
With this fluent and action repertoire, we can describe the initial state and the causal
rules as well as executability conditions guarding state transitions. As for the initial state,
the configuration of blocks shown on the left in Fig. 1 is expressed by the three facts
on(a,table), on(b,table), and on(c,a). Note that only positive facts are stated
for on; nevertheless the initial state is unique because the fluent on is interpreted under
the closed world assumption (CWA) [40], i.e., if on(B,L) does not hold, we assume that
it is false.
The values of the fluent occupied in the initial state are not specified explicitly, rather
they are obtained from a general rule that applies to all states, and thus is part of the
always-section of the program (the first rule there). It says that a block B is occupied if
something (B1) is on it. Note that the rule does not apply to B= table, since the table is
supposed to have unlimited capacity. Furthermore, B1 must be a block, by the declaration
of the fluent on.
Next we specify when an action move(B,L) is executable. The first condition states
that this is possible if the block B and the target location L are distinct (a block cannot be
moved onto itself). The two negative conditions nonexecutable. . . state that the move
is not executable if either the block B or the target location L is occupied, respectively.
These statements are shorthand macros for causation rules which interdict the execution of
an action (see Appendix A.3). Thus, the move is executable, if the positive condition holds
and both negative conditions fail.
In the standard blocksworld setting, only one block can be moved at a time. Another
macro, noConcurrency, enforces this. This macro is convenient for computing
sequential plans, i.e., plans under mutual exclusion of parallel actions.
The effects of a move action are defined by two dynamic rules. The first states that a
moved block is on the target location after the move, and the second that a block is not on
the location from which it was moved, provided it was moved to a different location.
The last statement in the always-section is an inertial statement for the fluent on,
which is another macro (see Appendix A.3) informally expressing that the fluent should
stay true, unless it explicitly becomes false in the new state.
To solve Sussman’s problem, the query in the goal-section contains the configuration
on the right side in Fig. 1, and furthermore, prescribes a plan length of 3 (which is
feasible).
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The semantics of planning domains is defined in terms of legal states and state
transitions. Informally, a state is any consistent collection of ground fluent literals which
respect the typing information. It is a legal initial state, if it satisfies all rules in the
initially-section and the rules in the always-section with empty after part under
answer set semantics (cf. Section 3.1) if causal rules are read as logic programming
rules. A state transition is a triple t = 〈s,A, s′〉 where s, s′ are states and A is a set of
legal action instances in PD, i.e., action instances that respect the typing information.
Such t is legal, if the action set A is executable w.r.t. s, i.e., each action a in A is the
head of a clause (3) whose body is true, and s′ satisfies all causal rules (2) from the
always-section whose after part is true with respect to s and A under answer set
semantics.
An optimistic plan for a goal g1, . . . , gm,not gm+1, . . . ,not gn is now a sequence
of action sets 〈A1, . . . ,Ai〉, i  0, such that a corresponding sequence T = 〈〈s0,A1, s1〉,
〈s1,A2, s2〉, . . . , 〈si−1,Ai, si〉〉 of legal state transitions 〈sj−1,Aj , sj 〉 exists that leads from
a legal initial state s0 to a state si which establishes the goal, i.e., {g1, . . . , gm} ⊆ si and
{gm+1, . . . , gn} ∩ si = ∅. This sequence of legal state transitions is called trajectory, and
a solution to a DLVK planning problem is an optimistic plan of length i specified in the
goal-section (cf. (4)).
Example 2.2 (Sussman’s problem (continued)). A well-known solution to Sussman’s
problem consists of first moving block c onto the table, then moving b on top of a, and
finally moving c on top of b.
In the DLVK setting, this amounts to the optimistic plan〈{move(c,table)}, {move(b,a)}, {move(c,b)}〉.
We omit the description of the (unique) trajectory for this plan at this point; it will be given
in Section 2.3.
2.1.1. Secure planning
DLVK has a special statement “securePlan.” which may be specified before the
goal-section. It instructs the system to compute only secure plans, which are special
optimistic plans. Note that securePlan is not a macro, and is, by complexity arguments,
not expressible as a macro which can be expanded efficiently.
Informally, an optimistic plan 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 is secure, if it is applicable under any
evolution of the system: starting from any legal initial state s0, the first action set A1
(i  1) can always be done (i.e., some legal transition 〈s0,A1, s1〉 exists), and for every
such possible state s1, the next action set A2 can be done etc., and eventually, after
having performed all actions, the goal is always established. Secure plans are often
called conformant plans in the literature, and are considered in scenarios with incomplete
information about initial states or nondeterministic action effects.
Example 2.3 (Blocksworld with incomplete initial state). Let us consider a different
planning problem in the blocksworld, illustrated in Fig. 3. Here, a further blockd is present,
whose exact location is unknown, but we know that it is not on top of c.
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Fig. 3. A blocksworld planning problem with incomplete initial state.
The background knowledge Πbw and the DLVK program for Sussman’s problem from
above are modified as follows.
For introducing block d to the planning domain, we add the fact block(d) to Πbw
and the fact -on(d,c). to the initially-section of the DLVK program.
Let us first consider the necessary extensions for handling cases in which the initial state
description is incorrect (e.g., when completing the partial initial state description, incorrect
initial states can arise). The following conditions should hold for each block: (i) It is on
top of a unique location, (ii) it does not have more than one block on top of it, and (iii) it is
supported by the table (i.e., it is either on the table or on a stack of blocks which is on the
table) [27].
It is straightforward to incorporate conditions (i) and (ii) into the initially-section:
initially : forbidden on(B,L), on(B,L1), L<> L1.
forbidden on(B1,B), on(B2,B), block(B), B1<> B2.
Here, forbidden is a macro (cf. Section A.3) which amounts to a constraint.
For condition (iii), we introduce a fluent supported, which should be true for any
block in a legal initial state:
fluents : supported(B) requires block(B).
We then describe supported and include a constraint that each block must be supported.
initially : caused supported(B) if on(B,table).
caused supported(B) if on(B,B1), supported(B1).
forbidden not supported(B).
Now we modify the goal-section to
goal : on(a,c), on(c,d), on(d,b), on(b,table) ? (4)
and, finally, to obtain a plan that works under any possible location of block d in the
beginning, we use the total f macro of DLVK (defined in Appendix A.3), which
generates the two alternatives for the value of a fluent f:
initially : total on(d,Y).
In this way, all completions of on which satisfy the initial state constraints lead to
legal initial states; in fact, there are two such states, corresponding to on(d,b) and
on(d,table).
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fluents : on(B,L) requires block(B), location(L).
occupied(B) requires location(B).
supported(B) requires block(B).
actions : move(B,L) requires block(B), location(L).
initially : on(a,table). on(b,table). on(c,a). -on(d,c).
total on(d,Y).
forbidden on(B,L), on(B,L1), L<> L1.
forbidden on(B1,B), on(B2,B), block(B), B1<> B2.
caused supported(B) if on(B,table).
caused supported(B) if on(B,B1), supported(B1).
forbidden not supported(B).
always : caused occupied(B) if on(B1,B), block(B).
executable move(B,L) if B<> L.
nonexecutable move(B,L) if occupied(B).
nonexecutable move(B,L) if occupied(L).
noConcurrency.
caused on(B,L) after move(B,L).
caused -on(B,L1) after move(B,L), on(B,L1), L<> L1.
inertial on(B,L).
goal : on(a,c), on(c,d), on(d,b), on(b,table) ? (4)
Fig. 4. DLVK program for a variant of Sussman’s problem in an incomplete world.
The rewritten DLVK program is depicted in Fig. 4, and using this program we are able to
compute the following solution, which is a secure plan:〈{move(d,table)}, {move(d,b)}, {move(c,d)}, {move(a,c)}〉
2.1.2. Knowledge-state vs. world-state planning
Knowledge state planning in K offers some features which are not available in
other planning languages. Recall that a knowledge state is a set of consistent fluent
literals, which describes the current knowledge about the planning world. The negation
as failure construct allows for expressing defeasible rules and default conclusions, by
which a more natural modeling of rational planning agents which have to deal with
incomplete information becomes possible at a qualitative level. In fact, a knowledge
state describes more accurately the belief set of an agent about the world, which is
formed by using strict and defeasible causal laws. This is in particular relevant if we are
interested in “reasonable” plans for achieving a goal. However, our framework is limited
to an elementary level, and does not directly allow for the representation of disjunctive
knowledge.
A useful feature of knowledge-state planning is that it may allow for an elegant encoding
of conformant planning problems with a world-state model in which the values of certain
fluents remain open. In particular, this applies if world states are projected to subsets of
fluents of interest. This supports forgetting information and, to some extent, focusing by
restricting attention to those fluents whose value may have an influence on the evolution
of the world depending on the actions that are taken. The advantages of a knowledge-
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Fig. 5. DLVK system architecture.
state encoding over a world-state encoding of the well-known “bomb in toilet” problem
[34] are discussed in Appendix C. For further discussion of knowledge-state planning, see
[6].
2.2. System architecture
The architecture of the DLVK system is outlined in Fig. 5. It accepts files containing
DLVK input and background knowledge stored as plain Datalog files. Then, by means
of suitable transformations from K to disjunctive logic programming that we will
describe in Section 3, it uses the classic DLV core to solve the corresponding planning
problem.
DLVK comes with two parsers: The first accepts DLVK files, that is, files with a filename
extension of .plan that constitute a DLVK program, while the second parser accepts
optional background knowledge specified as stratified Datalog. Both parsers are able to
read their input from an arbitrary number of files, and both convert this input to an internal
representation and store it in a common database.
The actual DLVK front-end consists of four main modules, the Controller, the Plan
Generator, the Plan Checker, and the Plan Printer. The Controller manages the other three
modules; it performs user interactions (where appropriate), and controls the execution of
the entire front-end.
To that end, the Controller first invokes the Plan Generator, which translates the
planning problem at hand into a suitable program in the core language of DLV (disjunctive
logic programming under the answer set semantics as described in Section 3.1) according
to the transformation lp(P) provided in Section 3.2. The Controller then invokes the DLV
kernel to solve the corresponding problem. The resulting answer sets (if any) are fed back
to the Controller, which extracts the solutions to the original planning problem from these
answer sets, transforms them back to the original planning domain, and saves them into
the common database.
The Controller then optionally (if the user specified the securePlan command or
invoked a secure check interactively) invokes the Plan Checker. Similarly to the Plan
Generator, the Checker uses the original problem description together with the optimistic
plan computed by the Generator to generate a disjunctive logic program that solves the
problem of verifying whether this (optimistic) plan is in fact also a secure plan as intuitively
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introduced in Section 2.1.1 (details and the actual transformation employed by the Plan
Checker will be provided in Section 4).
The Plan Printer, finally, translates the solutions found by the Generator (and optionally
verified by the Checker) back into suitable output for the planning user and prints it.
2.3. Using DLVK
DLVK is a command-line oriented system, which is realized as front-end to the DLV logic
programming system. It accepts two types of input files: (i) DLVK files, which carry the
filename extension .plan and contain DLVK code as described in Section 2.1; (ii) optional
background knowledge in the form of a stratified Datalog program, which is kept in files
without any filename extension.
The planning front-end itself is invoked by means of the -FP family of command-line
options: -FP, -FPopt and -FPsec, followed by any number of DLVK files and files
containing background knowledge.
• -FP invokes the DLVK system in interactive mode, where an optimistic plan is
computed and the user is then prompted whether to perform a security check for that
plan and whether to compute another (optimistic) plan, respectively.
• -FPopt computes all optimistic plans in batch mode, without user intervention, while
• -FPsec computes all secure plans (applying by default secure check SC1, as defined
in Section 4) in batch mode.
In all these cases, by means of the command-line option -n= x the number of plans
computed and printed can be limited to at most x; by default all possible plans are
computed.
Further DLVK command-line options which affect the security checking will be
introduced at the end of Section 4.
As an example, assume that the DLVK program for Sussman’s blocksworld planning
problem from Fig. 2 in Section 2.1 resides in a file blocksworld.plan, while the
background knowledge about blocks and locations is saved in a file background.
Invoking
dlv -FP blocksworld.plan background
results in the following output:
DLV [build DEV/Dec 17 2001 gcc 2.95.3 (release)]
STATE 0: occupied(a), on(a,table), on(b,table), on(c,a)
ACTIONS: move(c,table)
STATE 1: on(a,table), on(b,table), on(c,table), -on(c,a)
ACTIONS: move(b,a)
STATE 2: occupied(a), on(a,table), on(b,a), on(c,table),
-on(b,table)
ACTIONS: move(c,b)
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STATE 3: on(a,table), on(b,a), on(c,b), -on(c,table),
occupied(a), occupied(b)
PLAN: move(c,table); move(b,a); move(c,b)
Check whether that plan is secure (y/n)? y
The plan is secure.
Search for other plans (y/n)? y
This describes a successful trajectory 〈〈s0,A1, s1〉, 〈s1,A2, s2〉, 〈s2,A3, s3〉〉 where
s0, . . . , s3 correspond to the lines starting with STATE 0, . . . , STATE 3 in the output
above, and A1, A2, and A3 correspond to the three ACTIONS lines; the entire plan is again
printed at the end.
Now, let us consider the program from Fig. 4, that is, the variant of the Sussman problem
with an incomplete initial state. Let us assume that we have added the fact block(d)
to the background knowledge and modified the file blocksworld.plan accordingly. Again
invoking DLVK as above will produce the following output:
DLV [build DEV/Dec 17 2001 gcc 2.95.3 (release)]
STATE 0: occupied(a), on(a,table), on(b,table), on(c,a),
-on(d,c), supported(a), supported(b),
supported(c), -on(d,a), on(d,table), -on(d,b),
-on(d,d), supported(d)
ACTIONS: move(c,table)
STATE 1: on(a,table), on(b,table), on(c,table),
on(d,table), -on(c,a)
ACTIONS: move(d,b)
STATE 2: on(a,table), on(b,table), on(c,table), on(d,b),
-on(d,table), occupied(b)
ACTIONS: move(c,d)
STATE 3: on(a,table), on(b,table), on(c,d), on(d,b),
-on(c,table), occupied(b), occupied(d)
ACTIONS: move(a,c)
STATE 4: on(a,c), on(b,table), on(c,d), on(d,b),
-on(a,table), occupied(b), occupied(c),
occupied(d)
PLAN: move(c,table); move(d,b); move(c,d); move(a,c)
Check whether that plan is secure (y/n)? y
The plan is NOT secure.
Search for other plans (y/n)? y
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The first plan we arrive at is not secure, so we answer the question whether to search for
other plans positively, and indeed find a secure plan (observe that initial states (STATE 0)
are larger here because of the total statement for on(d,Y)):
STATE 0: occupied(a), on(a,table), on(b,table), on(c,a),
-on(d,c), supported(a), supported(b),
supported(c), -on(d,a), on(d,table), -on(d,b),
-on(d,d), supported(d)
ACTIONS: move(d,c)
STATE 1: on(a,table), on(b,table), on(c,a), on(d,c),
-on(d,table), occupied(a), occupied(c)
ACTIONS: move(d,b)
STATE 2: on(a,table), on(b,table), on(c,a), on(d,b),
-on(d,c), occupied(a), occupied(b)
ACTIONS: move(c,d)
STATE 3: on(a,table), on(b,table), on(c,d), on(d,b),
-on(c,a), occupied(b), occupied(d)
ACTIONS: move(a,c)
STATE 4: on(a,c), on(b,table), on(c,d), on(d,b),
-on(a,table), occupied(b), occupied(c),
occupied(d)
PLAN: move(d,c); move(d,b); move(c,d); move(a,c)
Check whether that plan is secure (y/n)? y
The plan is secure.
Search for other plans (y/n)?
While looking for further secure plans, we encounter several optimistic plans, none of
which is secure, so we change our strategy and invoke DLVK with the -FPsec option
instead of using the interactive mode enabled with -FP. This yield the following result:
DLV [build DEV/Dec 17 2001 gcc 2.95.3 (release)]
PLAN: move(d,c); move(d,b); move(c,d); move(a,c)
PLAN: move(d,table); move(d,b); move(c,d); move(a,c)
Indeed, while there are many optimistic plans, there is only just a single further secure
plan in addition to the one we already found. Note that, as secure plans usually have many
different trajectories, DLVK only prints the plans themselves, omitting the information on
states.
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3. Transforming optimistic planning to answer set programming
In this section, we discuss how planning problems in DLVK are transformed into answer
set programs. We consider here optimistic planning, and deal with secure planing in
the next section. As a preliminary, we first recall some concepts of (disjunctive) logic
programming.
3.1. Disjunctive logic programming
We consider extended disjunctive logic programs with two kinds of negation like in the
K language, i.e., weak negation “not” and strong negation “¬”, as introduced in [12]
over a function-free first-order language. Strings starting with uppercase (respectively,
lowercase) letters denote variables (respectively, constants). A positive (respectively
negative) classical literal l is either an atom a or a negated atom ¬a, respectively; its
complement, denoted ¬l, is ¬a and a, respectively. A positive (respectively, negative)
failure (NAF) literal # is of the form l or not l, where l is a classical literal. Unless
stated otherwise, by literal we mean a classical literal.
A disjunctive rule (rule, for short) R is a formula
a1 v . . . v an :- b1, . . . , bk, not bk+1, . . . ,not bm, (5)
where all ai and bj are classical literals and n  0, m  k  0. The part to the
left (respectively, right) of “:-” is the head (respectively, body) of R, where “:-”
is omitted if m= 0. We let H(R) = {a1, . . . , an} be the set of head literals and
B(R)= B+(R)∪B−(R) the set of body literals, where B+(R) = {b1, . . . , bk} and
B−(R)= {bk+1, . . . , bm}. A constraint is a rule with empty head (n= 0).
A disjunctive logic program (DLP) P (simply, program) is a finite set of rules. It is
positive, if it is not-free (i.e., ∀r ∈ P : B−(r) = ∅), and normal, if it is v-free (i.e.,
∀R ∈ P : |H(R)|  1). A normal program is also called a Datalog program. As usual,
a term (atom, rule etc.) is ground, if no variables appear in it. A ground program is also
called propositional.
Answer sets of DLPs are defined as consistent answer sets for EDLPs as in [12,25].
That is, for any program P , let UP be its Herbrand universe and BP be the Herbrand base
of P over UP (if no constant appears in P , an arbitrary constant is added to UP ). Let
ground(P )=⋃R∈P ground(R) denote the grounding of P , where ground(R) is the set of
all ground instances of R.
Then, an interpretation is any set I ⊆ BP of ground literals. An answer set of a positive
ground program P is any consistent interpretation I , i.e., I ∩ {¬l | l ∈ I } = ∅, such that
I is the least (w.r.t. set inclusion) set closed under the rules of P , i.e., B(R) ⊆ I implies
H(R)∩I = ∅ for everyR ∈ P .3 An interpretation I is an answer set of an arbitrary ground
program P , if it is an answer set of the Gelfond–Lifschitz reduct PI , i.e., the program
obtained from P by deleting
3 We only consider consistent answer sets, while in [12,25] also the (inconsistent) set BP may be an answer
set. Technically, we assume that negative classical literals ¬a are viewed as new atoms –a, and constraints :-a,–a
are implicitly added. This is the standard way how true negation is implemented in systems like DLV or Smodels.
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• all rules R ∈ P such that B−(R) ∩ I = ∅, and
• all negative body literals from the remaining rules.
The answer sets of a non-ground program P are those of its ground instantiation
ground(P ). We shall denote by AS(P ) the set of all answer sets of any program P .
3.2. Transformation lp(P)
The main building-block underlying the realization of the DLVK system is the translation
of a DLVK planning problem P, given by a background knowledge Π and a DLVK program
as in Section 2.1, into a logic program lp(P), whose answer sets represent the optimistic
plans of P. For the sake of our translation, we extend fluent and action literals by a
timestamp parameter T such that an answer set AS of the translated program lp(P)
corresponds to a successful trajectory T = 〈〈s0,A1, s1〉, . . . , 〈sn−1,An, sn〉〉 of P in the
following sense:
• The fluent literals in AS having timestamp 0 represent a (legal) initial state s0 of T .
• The fluent literals in AS having timestamp i > 0 represent the state si obtained after
executing i many action sets (i.e., they represent the evolution after i steps).
• The action literals in AS having timestamp i represent the actions in Ai+1 (i.e., those
actions which are executed at step i + 1).
Moreover, trajectories encoded in the answer sets of lp(P) are guaranteed to establish the
goal of the planning problem, and the underlying sequence of action sets is therefore an
optimistic plan.
In the following, we incrementally describe a transformation from a planning problem
P to a logic program lp(P). We will illustrate this transformation on the blocksworld
planning problem from Section 2.1.
In what follows, let σ act, σ fl , and σ typ be the sets of action, fluent and type names,
respectively, and let Lact, L+act, Lfl , and Ltyp be the set of all action, positive action, fluent,
and type literals, respectively. Furthermore, Lfl,typ = Lfl ∪Ltyp and Ldyn = Lfl ∪L+act (dyn
stands for dynamic literals).
Step 0 (Macro expansion). In a preliminary step, replace all macros in the DLVK-program
by their definitions (cf. Appendix A.3).
Example. In the encoding of Sussman’s problem, among others the macros
always : nonexecutable move(B,L) if occupied(B).
inertial on(B,L).
are replaced by
caused false after move(B,L), occupied(B).
on(B,L) if not -on(B,L) after on(B,L).
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Step 1 (Background knowledge). The background knowledge Π is already given as a logic
program; all the rules in Π can be directly included in lp(P), without further modification.
Step 2 (Auxiliary predicates). To represent steps, we add the following facts to lp(P)
time(0)., . . . ,time(i).
next(0,1)., . . . ,next(i − 1, i).
where i is the plan length of the query q =G?(i) ∈P at hand.
The predicate time denotes all possible timestamps and the predicate next describes
a successor relation over the timestamps in our program.
Note that we refrain from using built-in predicates of a particular logic programming
engine here. In the DLVK implementation, all above auxiliary predicates are efficiently
handled in a preprocessing step.
Example. For Sussman’s problem, where q = on(c,b), on(b,a), on(a,table)? (3),
we add the following facts:
time(0). time(1). time(2). time(3).
next(0,1). next(1,2). next(2,3).
Step 3 (Causation rules). For each causation rule r:caused H if B after A in CR ,
we include a rule r ′ into lp(P) as follows:
h(r ′)=
{∅, if H = false,
f (t¯, T1), if H = f (t¯), f ∈ σ fl,
where T1 is a new variable. To the body of r ′, we add the following literals:
• each default type literal in r , i.e., (not)l ∈A∪B where l ∈ Ltyp;
• (not) b(t¯, T1), where (not) b(t¯) ∈B and b(t¯) ∈ Lfl;
• (not) b(t¯, T0), where (not) b(t¯) ∈A and b(t¯) ∈Ldyn, where T0 is a new variable;
• for timing, we add
– time(T1), if A is empty;
– next(T0,T1), otherwise.
• To respect typing declarations and to establish standard safety of r ′, we add for any
action/fluent literal in H and default negated fluents/actions literals typing information
from the corresponding action/fluent declarations. That is, if H = (¬)p(t¯) respectively
not (¬)p(t¯) ∈A∪B such that p(t¯) ∈Ldyn,
p(Y ) requires t1(Y1), . . . , tm(Ym)
is an action/fluent declaration (standardized apart), and θ is a substitution such that
θ(Y )= t¯ , then we add θ(t1(Y1)), . . . , θ(tm(Ym)) to the body for r ′. If p has multiple
action/fluent declarations, each of them is considered separately, which gives rise to
multiple typed versions of r ′.
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Example. In our encoding of Sussman’s problem, the statement
always : caused occupied(B) if on(B1,B), block(B).
leads to the following rule in lp(P):
occupied(B,T1):- on(B1,B,T1),block(B),location(B),time(T1).
Here, the timing atom time(T1) is added, and the type information location(B) for
the fluent occupied(B) in the H -part of the statement.
Step 4 (Executability conditions). For each executability condition e of the form
executable a(t¯) if B in CR , we introduce a rule e′ in lp(P) as follows:
h(e′)= a(t¯, T0) v ¬a(t¯, T0),
where T0 is a new variable. To the body of e′, we add the following literals:
• Each default type literal in e, i.e., (not)l ∈ B where l ∈ Ltyp;
• (not) b(t¯, T0), where (not) b(t¯) ∈B and l ∈Ldyn;
• next(T0,T1) where T1 is a new variable;
• for typing and safety, type information literals for a(t¯) and every default literal
not (¬)p(t ) ∈ B such that p(t ) ∈ Ldyn, similar as in Step 3 (which may lead to
multiple rules e′).
Example. In our running example, the condition
executable move(B,L) if B <> L.
introduces in lp(P) the rule
move(B,L,T0) v − move(B,L,T0):- B <> L, block(B),
location(L), next(T0,T1).
Here, type information block(B), location(L) is added for move(B,L).
Step 5 (Initial state constraints). Initial state constraints in IR′ are transformed like static
causation rules r in Step 3 (i.e., A is empty), but we use the constant 0 instead of the
variable T1 and omit the literal time(0).
Example. The facts in IR :
initially: on(a,table). on(b,table). on(c,a).
become:
on(a,table,0). on(b,table,0). on(c,a,0).
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Step 6 (Goal query). Finally, the query q :
goal : g1(t1), . . . , gm(tm),not gm+1(tm+1), . . . ,not gn(tn) ? (i).
is translated to:
goal_reached:- g1(t1, i), . . . , gm(tm, i), not gm+1(tm+1, i), . . . ,not gn(tn, i).
:- not goal_reached.
where goal_reached is a new predicate symbol.
Example. q = on(c,b), on(b,a), on(a,table) ? (3), the goal for Sussman’s problem,
leads to the following rules in lp(P):
goal_reached:- on(c,b,3), on(b,a,3), on(a,table,3).
:- not goal_reached.
The complete transformation of Sussman’s blocksworld problem, Pbw , after expansion of
all macros (see Appendix A.3), is shown in Fig. 6.
As the reader can easily verify, the above transformation employs disjunction only in
Step 4 for translating executability conditions. Furthermore, negated action atoms¬a(t, T )
occur only in the heads of the rules of lp(P). Thus, the program is head-cycle-free, which
is profitably exploited by the DLV engine underlying our implementation. The disjunction,
which informally encodes a guess of whether the action a(t ) is executed or not at time
block(a). block(b). block(c). location(table).
location(B) :- block(B).
time(0). time(1). time(2). time(3). next(0,1). next(1,2). next(2,3).
on(a,table,0) :- block(a),location(table).
on(b,table,0) :- block(b),location(table).
on(c,a,0) :- block(c),location(a).
move(B,L,T0) v -move(B,L,T0):- B<> L,block(B),
location(L),next(T0,T1).
:- move(B,L,T0),occupied(B,T0),next(T0,T1).
:- move(B,L,T0),occupied(L,T0),next(T0,T1).
occupied(B,T1) :- on(B1,B,T1),block(B),location(B),time(T1).
on(B,L,T1) :- on(B,L,T0),not -on(B,L,T1),block(B),location(L),
next(T0,T1).
on(B,L,T1) :- move(B,L,T0),block(B),location(L),next(T0,T1).
-on(B,L1,T1) :- move(B,L,T0),on(B,L1),L<> L1,block(B),
location(L1),next(T0,T1).
:- move(t1,t2,T0),move(t′1,t′2,T0). for t1,t′1 ∈ {a,b,c}
t2,t′2 ∈ {a,b,c,table}, (t1,t2) = (t′1,t′2)
goal_reached :- on(c,b,3),on(b,a,3),on(a,table,3).
:- not goal_reached.
Fig. 6. Transformation of Sussman’s planning problem Pbw from Section 2.1.
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T0, may equivalently be replaced by v-free guessing rules. The adapted transformation can
then be used on engines for computing answer sets of normal programs, such as Smodels.
The following result formally states the desired correspondence between the solutions
of a DLVK planning problem P and the answer sets of the logic program lp(P) obtained by
following the procedure described above.
Theorem 3.1 (Answer set correspondence). Let P be a planning problem, given by a
background knowledgeΠ and a DLVK-program, and let lp(P) the logic program generated
by Steps 0–6 above. Define, for any consistent set of literals S, the sets ASj = {a(t) |
a(t, j − 1) ∈ S, a ∈ σ act} and sSj = {f (t) | f (t, j) ∈ S, f (t) ∈ Lfl}, for all j  0. Then,
(i) for each optimistic plan P = 〈A1, . . . ,Ai〉 of P and witnessing trajectory T =
〈〈s0,A1, s1〉, 〈s1,A2, s2〉, . . . , 〈si−1,Ai, si〉〉, there exists some answer set S of lp(P)
such that Aj = ASj for all j = 1, . . . , i and sj = sSj , for all j = 0, . . . , i;
(ii) for each answer set S of lp(P), the sequence P = 〈A1, . . . ,Ai〉 is a solution of P,
i.e., an optimistic plan, witnessed by the trajectory T = 〈〈s0,A1, s1〉, 〈s1,A2, s2〉, . . . ,
〈si−1,Ai, si〉〉, where Aj =ASj and sk = sSk for all j = 1, . . . , i and k = 0, . . . , i .
Proof. The proof is based on the well-known notion of splitting of a logic program
as defined in [28]. We define the splitting sequence U = 〈UBG,U0, . . . ,Ui,UG〉 =
〈BG,BG ∪ S0, . . . , BG ∪ S0 ∪ · · · ∪ Si,BG ∪ S0 ∪ · · · ∪ Si ∪ G〉 of the program P ′ =
ground(lp(P)) as follows:
• BG is the set of type literals and time and next literals occurring in P ′;
• Sj , 0 j  i , is the set of literals in P ′ of the form f (t, j), where f ∈ σ fl , and of the
form a(t, j − 1), where a ∈ σ act;
• G= {goal_reached}.
By the Splitting Sequence Theorem of [28], P ′ (and thus lp(P)) has some (con-
sistent) answer set S iff S = XBG ∪ X0 ∪ · · · ∪ Xi ∪ XG for some solution X =
〈XBG,X0, . . . ,Xi,XG〉 of P ′ w.r.t. U . We note the following facts.
• PBG = bUBG(P ′) (as defined in [28], intuitively the program corresponding to UBG)
consists of the background program and of the facts defining time and next.
• P0 = eUBG(bU0(P ′) \ bUBG(P ′),XBG) (as defined in [28], intuitively the program
corresponding to U0) consists of rules and constraints which are translations of initial
state constraints and static rules (i.e., causation rules with empty after), in which the
argument of time and the last argument of the head predicates has been instantiated
with 0.
• Pj = eUj−1(bUj (P ′)\bUj−1(P ′),XBG∪X0∪· · ·∪Xj−1), for 1 j  i (intuitively, the
program corresponding to Uj ), consists of rules and constraints which are translations
of causation rules and executability conditions in the always-section, in which the
argument of time and the second argument of next is instantiated with j (thus, the
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last argument in head predicates of causation rules and executability conditions is j
and j − 1, respectively).
• PG = eUi (bUG(P ′) \ bUi (P ′), XBG ∪ X0 ∪ · · · ∪ Xi) (intuitively the program
corresponding to UG) consists of the rule and the constraint which were generated
by Step 6.
• XBG ∪X0 ∪ · · · ∪Xi ∪XG is a consistent set iff each of the sets XBG,X0, . . . , Xi,XG
is consistent, since no literal in any of the sets BG, S0, . . . , Si ,G exists such that its
complement is contained in any other of these sets.
We now prove (i) and (ii) of the theorem.
(i) We show that for each optimistic plan a corresponding answer set S of lp(P) as
described exists. By the Splitting Sequence Theorem, we must prove that a respective
solution X = 〈XBG,X0, . . . ,Xi,XG〉 of lp(P) exists:
XBG: As s0 is a legal initial state, the background knowledge has a consistent answer
set. Thus, by definition of PBG, it clearly has a consistent answer set XBG.
X0: s0 in the witnessing trajectory must be a legal initial state, so s0 satisfies all rules in
the initially-section and the rules in the always-section with empty after
part, under answer set semantics if causal rules are read as logic programming
rules. These rules are essentially identical (modulo the time literals and the
timestamp arguments) to P0, so X0 exists and s0 = sS,P0 .
Xj : For 1  j  i , 〈sj−1,Aj , sj 〉 must be a legal transition. We proceed inductively.
Aj has to be an executable action set w.r.t. sj−1, so each action a ∈Aj must occur
in the head of an executability condition whose body is true w.r.t. sj−1. There must
be a corresponding clause in Pj constructed by Step 4 of the translation such that,
the body is true w.r.t. Xj−1. If we choose Xj such that AS,Pj =Aj , then all these
rules are satisfied. Each rule in Pj which has an action literal la in the head such
that la is not in Aj either does not have a true body in Xj−1, or we include its
negation ¬la into Xj .
Furthermore, sj satisfies all causal rules from the always-section whose
after part is true w.r.t. sj−1 and Aj under answer set semantics. From the
correspondence of causal rules from the always-section and rules in Pj , we
may thus conclude that Pj has an answer set Xj s.t. sj = sS,Pj and Aj = AS,Pj ,
as seen above.
XG: si satisfies the goal of P. Let g1, . . . , gm,not gm+1, . . . ,not gn?(i) be the
goal of P. Then {g1, . . . , gm} ⊆ si and {gm+1, . . . , gn} ∩ si = ∅ hold. Since
si = sXi,Pi , the body of the rule generated in Step 6 is true and therefore XG =
{goal_reached} exists.
In total, we have shown that for each optimistic plan of P a corresponding answer set S
of lp(P) exists, which contains literals representing a witnessing trajectory.
(ii) We must prove that for each answer set S of lp(P), a corresponding optimistic plan
of P exists. By the Splitting Sequence Theorem, a solution X = 〈XBG, X0, . . . ,Xi,XG〉
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exists for lp(P). Since X0 is an answer set for the program corresponding to initial state
constraints and static rules, a legal initial state s0 = sS,P0 must exist as well.
For Xj , 1  j  i , we proceed inductively. All rules corresponding to executability
conditions w.r.t. time j−1 must be satisfied, so for every literal la in Xj which corresponds
to a positive action literal, a rule in Pj whose body is true w.r.t. Xj−1 and in which la is the
only true head literal, must exist. By construction, an executability condition whose body
is true w.r.t. sj−1 and whose head is the corresponding action literal, must exist in P, so an
executable action set Aj =AS,Pj exists w.r.t. sj−1.
All rules in Pj corresponding to causal rules from the always-section of P must be
satisfied by Xj and Xj−1 (for literals translated from after-parts). So for each causal
rule in P, either its after-part is false w.r.t. Aj and sj−1, or the causal rule is satisfied by
the state sj = sS,Pj .
Finally, since XG exists, goal_reached must be true. Hence, the body of the rule
generated in Step 6 must be true, and therefore si must establish the goal of P.
In total, we have shown that for each answer set S of lp(P) an optimistic plan of P
exists, such that the witnessing trajectory can be constructed from S as described. ✷
4. Secure planning
The translation in the previous section results in logic programs where the projections
of the answer sets on the positive actions correspond to optimistic plans.
As we have already mentioned above, the DLVK system also provides the functionality
of checking whether a given optimistic plan is secure for certain planning domains. Thus,
a secure plan may be found in two steps as follows: (i) Find an optimistic plan P , and (ii)
check whether P is secure. The test (ii) informally amounts to testing the following three
conditions:
(1) the actions of P are executable in the respective stages of the execution;
(2) at any stage, executing the respective actions ofP always leads to some legal successor
state; and
(3) the goal is true in every possible state reached if all steps of the plan are successfully
executed.
In arbitrary planning domains, the security check is .P2 -complete [6],4 and thus, by
widely believed complexity hypotheses, it is not polynomially reducible to a SAT solver or
other computational logic system with expressiveness bounded by NP or co-NP. However,
as shown in [6], a polynomial reduction is possible for the class of proper propositional
planning problems, where a planning problem P is proper, if the underlying planning
domain PD is proper, i.e., given any state s and any set of actions A, deciding whether
some legal state transition 〈s,A, s′〉 exists is possible in polynomial time.
4 I.e., co-P2 -complete (cf. [36]).
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In the DLVK system, we have focused on proper propositional planning domains, and
we have implemented security checking by a polynomial reduction to logic programs with
complexity in co-NP.
Note that for a proper planning domain PD, there is an algorithm APD which, given
an arbitrary state s and a set of actions A, decides in polynomial time whether some legal
transition 〈s,A, s′〉 exists. The existence of such an algorithm APD , given PD, is difficult
to decide, even in the propositional case, and APD is not efficiently constructible under
widely accepted complexity beliefs. We thus looked for suitable semantic properties of
planning domains which can be ensured by syntactic conditions and enable a simple (or
even trivial) check for the existence of a legal transition 〈s,A, s′〉, which uniformly works
for a class of accepted planning domains.
4.1. false-committed domains and security check SC1
One such condition is when, informally, the existence of a legal transition 〈s,A, s′〉
can only be blocked by a causal rule with head false or by an (implicit) consistency
constraint :-f, -f. That is, if such constraints are disregarded, some legal transition
〈s,A, s′〉 always exists, otherwise, if some constraint is violated in any such s′, then no
legal transition 〈s,A, s′〉 exists. This condition can be ensured by a syntactic condition
which employs stratification on the causation rules.
With this in mind, we develop a security check SC1, which, given an optimistic plan
P = 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 of length n  0 for a planning problem P, rewrites the logic program
lp(P) in Section 3 to a logic program Π1(P,P ) and returns “yes” if this program has no
answer set, and “no” otherwise.
The modifications are as follows:
• In order to check condition (1) mentioned at the beginning of this section, the
rules resulting from executability conditions are removed from lp(P). Instead, for an
executability condition of the form
executable a(X) if B1(Y1), . . . ,Bm(Ym),not Bm+1(Ym+1), . . . ,not Bn(Yn)
in P, we generate the following rule for each a(c) ∈Aj+1 (j = 0, . . . , n− 1) of P , where
σ is the substitution mapping the variables X to c:
σ
(
a(X, j) :- B1(Y1, j), . . . ,Bm(Ym, j),
not Bm+1(Ym+1, j), . . . ,not Bn(Yn, j),next(j, j + 1)
)
.
This enforces that whenever an action a(c) in the plan P is executable in the respective
state j , then a(c, j) will be derived by Π1(P,P ); no further actions will be derived. To
guarantee that the actions of the plan P are always executable, we add a rule
notex :- not a(c, j).
for each a(c) ∈ Aj+1. Here, notex is a new auxiliary predicate which intuitively
expresses that the plan P cannot be properly executed; its truth allows building a witness
for the insecurity of P .
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• Concerning condition (2), in any situation where a causal rule with head false is
violated or a fluent inconsistency arises, an answer set witnessing the insecurity of P
should be generated. To this end, the transformation is modified as follows:
Each constraint :- Body, time(T1). in lp(P) derived from a causal rule of the form
caused false..., is rewritten to
notex :- Body, time(T1), T1 > 0.
:- σ(Body).
where σ is a substitution mapping T1 to 0. Observe that violation of constraints referring
to an initial state does not generate a counterexample.
Each constraint:-Body, next(T0, T1). in lp(P) which has been derived from a causal
rule caused false..., is rewritten to
notex :- Body, next(T0, T1).
And for each fluent f (X), the (implicit) consistency constraint (discussed in Footnote 2)
is transformed to a rule for non-initial states
notex :- f (X,T1), –f (X,T1), time(T1), T1 > 0.
while those for the initial state remain unchanged:
:- f (X,0), −f (X,0).
Constraint violations (explicit or implicit) in non-initial states therefore lead to a witnessing
answer set containing notex.
• Finally, for condition (3), the goal constraint :- not goal_reached. is modified
to
:- goal_reached, not notex.
We can read the rewritten goal constraint as follows: The constraint is satisfied, and thus
the plan P is not secure, if (i) either notex is true, which means that some action in P
cannot be executed or a constraint is violated when executing the actions in P , or (ii) if
goal_reached is false, which means that after successfully executing all actions in P ,
the goal is not established.
Before we can state the informal conditions, under which the security check SC1 works,
more precisely, we need some auxiliary concepts.
Definition 4.1 (Constraint-free, constraint- & executability-condition-free shadow). For
any planning domain PD = 〈Π, 〈D,R〉〉, let cfs(PD) denote the planning domain which
results from PD by dropping all causal constraints with head false and interpreting
negative fluents as new (positive) fluents, and call it the constraint-free shadow of PD.
Furthermore, let cefs(PD) denote the planning domain derived from cfs(PD) by omitting
all executability conditions and adding executable a. for each legal action instance a,
and call it the constraint- and executability–condition-free shadow of PD.
Definition 4.2 (false-committed planning domains). We call a planning domain PD
false-committed, if the following conditions hold:
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(i) If s is a legal state in PD and A is an action set which is executable in s w.r.t. PD, then
either (i.1) every legal transition 〈s,A, s′〉 in cfs(PD) is also a legal transition in PD,
or (i.2) no 〈s,A, s′′〉 is a legal transition in PD, for all states s′′ in PD.
(ii) For any state s and action setA in cefs(PD), there exists some legal transition 〈s,A, s′〉
in cefs(PD).
Example 4.1 (Blocksworld with incomplete initial state (continued)). Let us reconsider the
blocksworld planning problem of Example 2.3. It is easily seen that our formulation of
the respective planning domain, PDbwi , is false-committed. Indeed, it contains a single
occurrence of default negation not , via the statement inertial on(B,L)., which is
not critical for the existence of a successor state in cefs(PD), so condition (ii) is guaranteed.
As for condition (i), for each state s and action set A, which is executable in s, there is a
single legal transition 〈s,A, s′〉 in cfs(PDbwi), and thus one of the cases (i.1) and (i.2) must
apply.
Consider first the optimistic plan P which is secure, as we have seen:〈{move(d,table)}, {move(d,b)}, {move(c,d)}, {move(a,c)}〉.
Indeed, an attempt to build an answer set S of Π1(Pbwi,P ) fails: starting from
any initial state, the actions in Ai are always executable and no constraint is vio-
lated, thus notex cannot be included in S. To satisfy the rewritten goal constraint
:- goal_reached,not notex. thus goal_reached must not be included in
S. However, as easily seen, the atoms on(a,c,2), on(c,d,2), on(d,b,2),
on(b,table,2) must be included in S. This, however, means that goal_reached
has to be included in S, which is a contradiction. Thus, no answer set S exists, which
means that the plan P is secure.
Let us now modify the number of steps in the goal to i = 2, and consider the optimistic
plan P〈{move(c,d)}, {move(a,c)}〉
In this case we can build an answer set of Π1(Pbwi,P ) starting from an initial state in
which block d is on the table, by including at each stage the literals that are enforced.
Then, both actions in the plan can be executed, and we end up in a state in which the
goal is not satisfied. Both goal_reached and notex cannot be derived, and thus the
constraint :-goal_reached, not notex. in Π1(Pbwi,P ) is satisfied, admitting an
answer set which witnesses the insecurity of P . Hence, the check outputs “no”, i.e., the
plan is not secure.
To show that the security check SC1 works properly for all false-committed planning
domains, we need the notions of soundness and completeness for security checks.
Definition 4.3 (Security check). A security check for a class of planning domains PD is
any algorithm which takes as input a planning problem P in a planning domain from the
class PD and an optimistic plan P for P, and outputs “yes” or “no”. A security check is
sound, if it reports “yes” only if P is a secure plan for P, and is complete if it reports “yes”
in case P is a secure plan for P.
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In other words, for a sound security check only “yes” can be trusted, while for a
complete security check “no” can be trusted.
Theorem 4.1. The security check SC1 is sound and complete for the class of false-
committed planning domains.
Proof. We outline the proof, but omit the details. Let P = 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 be an optimistic
plan for a planning problem P in a false-committed planning domain PD.
(Soundness) Suppose that P is not secure. This means that an initial state s0 and a
trajectory T = 〈〈s0,A1, s1〉, . . . , 〈sj−1,Aj , sj 〉〉 in PD (where 0  j  n) exist, such that
one of the conditions (1)–(3) for plan security stated at the beginning of this section is
violated. We then can build an answer set S of the program Π1(P,P ), in which, starting
from s0, respective literals are included which correspond to the legal transitions in T as in
lp(P). We consider the three cases:
Suppose first that condition (1) is violated, i.e., some action a(c) in the action set Aj of
P is not executable. Then, no rule with head a(c, j) fires, and thus we may add notex
to S, as it can be derived from the rule notex :- not a(c, j). By (ii) of false-
committedness for PD, we can add literals for the stages j + 1, . . . , n modeling transitions
in cefs(PD) to S such that we obtain an answer set of Π1(P,P ).
Suppose next that condition (2) is violated, i.e., no successor state exists. By (ii)
of false-committedness for PD, we can add literals to S modeling a legal transition
〈sj ,Aj+1, sj+1〉 in cfs(PD), and by (i) of false-committedness for PD, notex will be
derived, as in PD some rule with head false fires or opposite fluent literals f, - -f are
in S. Using (ii) again, we can add literals for the remaining stages j + 2, . . . , n modeling
transitions in cefs(PD), such that we obtain an answer set S of Π1(P,P ).
Suppose finally that condition (3) is violated. That is, j = n and the goal is not satisfied
by sn. Then, the rule with head goal_reached is not applicable, the modified goal
constraint is satisfied, and an answer set S exists. Note that this also includes the case
n= 0.
In any of these three cases, an answer set S of Π1(P,P ) exists, and SC1(P,P ) outputs
“no”.
(Completeness) Suppose SC1(P,P ) outputs “no”, i.e., Π1(P,P ) has some answer
set S. Then, either notex ∈ S or goal_reached /∈ S must hold. In the former case,
notex must be derived either (a) from some rule r : notex :- not a(c, j)., or (b)
from some rule notex :- ... time(j). corresponding to a rewritten constraint
with head false or a consistency constraint for strong negation. Let r be such that
j is minimal. Then S encodes with respect to the stages 0, . . . , j − 1 a trajectory
T = 〈〈s0,A1, s1〉, . . . , 〈sj−1,Aj , sj 〉〉, such that Aj+1 is not executable in sj w.r.t. PD.
In case (a), we immediately obtain that condition (1) of security is violated and hence
that P is not secure. In case (b), a trajectory T = 〈〈s0,A1, s1〉, . . . , 〈sj−2,Aj−1, sj−1〉〉
in PD exists such that executing Aj in sj−1 w.r.t. cfs(PD) as encoded in S leads to a
state sj which violates some constraint of PD with head false or contains opposite
literals. By item (i) of false-committedness for PD, we can conclude that no legal
transition 〈sj−1,Aj , sj 〉 exists in PD, which violates condition (2) of security. On the
other hand, if goal_reached /∈ S while notex /∈ S, then S encodes a trajectory
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T = 〈〈s0,A1, s1〉, . . . , 〈sn−1,An, sn〉〉 w.r.t. PD such that in the final state sn the goal is
false, i.e., condition (3) of security is violated. That is, in all cases P is not secure. ✷
Now that we have introduced the class of false-committed planning domains, we
look for syntactic conditions on planning domains which can be efficiently checked
and guarantee false-committedness. One such condition can be obtained by imposing
stratification on causation rules as follows: For any causation rule r of the form (A.2) let
lp(r) be the corresponding logic programming rule f:-b1, . . . , bk,not bk+1, . . . ,not bl
which emerges by skipping the after-part.
Definition 4.4 (Stratified planning domain). A planning domain PD = 〈Π, 〈D,R〉〉 is
stratified, if the logic program ΠPD consisting of all rules lp(r), where r ∈ CR has
h(r) = false and a nonempty if-part, is stratified in the usual sense (and strongly
negated atoms are treated as new atoms).
For example, the blocksworld planning domain PDbwi described above is stratified.
It is easy to see that stratified planning domains are false-committed. Indeed, since
any stratified logic program is guaranteed to have an answer set, item (ii) of Definition 4.2
holds. Furthermore, for each legal state s and action set A which is executable in s w.r.t.
PD, there exists a single candidate state s′ for a legal transition 〈s,A, s′〉 in cfs(PD), which
is computed by evaluating a subset of the rules of ΠPD ; this transition is not legal in PD if
s′ violates some constraint in CR with head false or introduces inconsistency. Note that
stratified planning domains PD are proper.
Corollary 4.2. The security check SC1 is sound and complete for the class of stratified
planning domains.
A possible extension of Corollary 4.2 allows for limited usage of unstratified causation
rules. For example, pairs
inertial f.
inertial -f.
of positive and negative inertia rules for the same ground fluent f, which amount to the
rules
r+f : caused f if not -f after f.
r−f : caused -f if not f after -f.
violate stratification. Nevertheless, pairwise inertia for a fluent f can be allowed safely, if
each of the two rules together with the remainder of the planning domain is stratified. That
is, we check for stratification of the two subdomains that result from the planning domain
PD by omitting the positive and negative inertia rules for f , denoted by PD−f and PD+f ,
respectively. If both PD−f and PD+f are stratified, then SC1 is sound and complete for
PD. This holds because in any state s, only one of the rules r+f and r
−
f can be active with
respect to s.
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We can further extend this to multiple pairs of ground inertia rules, where combinations
for positive and negative inertia rules have to be checked. We go one step further and extend
it to mux-stratified planning domains, which we define next.
Two causation rules r0, r1 in PD are a mutually exclusive pair (mux-pair), if their
after-parts are not simultaneously satisfiable in any state s and for any executable action
set A w.r.t. s in PD.
Definition 4.5 (Mux-stratified planning domains). Let PD be a planning domain and
E = {(ri,0, ri,1) | 1  i  n}, n  0, a set of mux-pairs in PD. Then, PD is called mux-
stratified w.r.t. E, if each planning domain PD′ that results from PD by removing one of
the rules ri,0 and ri,1 for all i = 1, . . . , n is stratified.
Notice that E does not necessarily contain all mux-pairs occurring in PD; we may even
choose E = ∅, where mux-stratified coincides with stratified planning domain.
Note that E induces a bipartite graph GE , whose vertices are the rules occurring in E
and whose edges are the pairs in E. The removal sets for building PD′ which need to be
considered are given by the maximal independent sets of GE . There may be exponentially
many such sets, and thus the cost for (simple) mux-stratification testing grows fast.
We now establish the following result.
Theorem 4.3. Every planning domain PD which is mux-stratified w.r.t. some set of mux-
pairs E is false-committed.
Proof. Consider any state s and executable action set A w.r.t. s in PD. Denote by
active(s,A,PD) the set of all ground rules in ground(ΠPD) which correspond to instances
r ′ of causation rules in PD such that the after-part of r ′ is true w.r.t. s, A and the answer
set M of the background knowledge.
Then, we claim that active(s,A,PD) is stratified, i.e., its (ground) dependency graph
does not contain a negative cycle. Indeed, towards a contradiction assume that the (ground)
dependency graph of active(s,A,PD) contains a negative cycle C. Then, C involves only
rules which correspond to instances of causation rules not occurring in E, and rules which
correspond to instances of causation rules from r1,i1, . . . , rn,in , where E = {(ri,0, ri,1) | 1
i  n} and ij ∈ {0,1}, for all j = 1, . . . , n. (A rule R is involved in all edges l1 → l2
of the dependency graph, where l1 ∈ H(R) and l2 ∈ B(R).) This means that C is also
present in the ground dependency graph of ΠPD′ for some PD′ which results from PD by
removing the causation rules r1,1−1j , r1,1−2j , . . . , rn,1−nj . Consequently, the (non-ground)
dependency graph of ΠPD′ contains a negative cycle. This, however, contradicts that PD is
mux-stratified w.r.t. E; the claim is proved.
Since the ground program active(s,A,PD) is stratified, it is easily seen that conditions
(i) and (ii) of false-committedness hold for s. Since s was arbitrary, it follows that PD
is false-committed. ✷
By combining Theorems 4.1 and 4.3, we obtain the following corollary.
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Corollary 4.4. The security check SC1 is sound and complete for the class of mux-stratified
planning domains, and in particular if E consists of opposite ground inertial-rules.
The DLVK system provides limited support for testing mux-stratification, which
currently works for the set E consisting of all opposite ground inertia rules; an extension
to larger classes is planned for future DLVK releases. Notice, however, that deciding
whether a given pair (r0, r1) is a mux-pair in a given planning domain is intractable in
general.
A generalization of the result in Corollary 4.4 to sets E of non-ground opposite
inertial rules fails. The reason is that in this case, multiple transition candidates 〈s,A, s′〉
exist in cfs(PD) in general, which correspond to multiple answer sets of the program
active(s,A,PD). However, some of them might not be legal in PD, and condition (i)
of false-committedness may be violated. Preliminary results suggest that under further
restrictions, like excluding constraints and causation rules with opposite unifiable heads,
SC1 may be applied. We leave this for further work.
4.2. Serial planning domains and security check SC2
Besides SC1, the DLVK system provides an alternative security check SC2 for handling
other classes of proper planning domains, and the system design easily allows the
incorporation of further security checks.
The check SC2 is obtained by a slight modification of the program clauses in
Π1(PD,P ), resulting in a program Π2(PD,P ) as follows: the head notex of each rule
which stems from a causal rule r such that h(r)= false and the if-part is not empty, is
shifted to the negative body, i.e.,
notex :- Body.
is rewritten to
:- Body, not notex.
Informally, this shift means that the violation of a constraint on the successor state s′ is
tolerated, and we eliminate s′ as a counterexample to the security of the plan.
We will see that this check works for the following class of planning domains.
Definition 4.6 (Serial planning domains). A planning domain PD is serial, if it has the
following properties:
(i) if s is a state in PD and A is executable in s w.r.t. PD, then some legal transition
〈s,A, s′〉 is guaranteed to exist, and, moreover,
(ii) for any state s and set of actions A in cefs(PD), some legal transition 〈s,A, s′〉 exists
w.r.t. cefs(PD).
Obviously, serial planning domains PD are proper, as the checkAPD for telling whether
a legal transition exists for s and executable A is trivial (just always return “yes”). The
following can be observed:
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Theorem 4.5. The security check SC2 is sound and complete for serial planning domains.
The proof of this result is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, and we thus omit it.
A syntactical restriction guaranteeing seriality are stratified planning domains PD which
contain no rules r such that h(r) = false and employ no strong negation. The serial
property is preserved if we we also allow arbitrary totalization statements and limited use
of strong negation, e.g., either all occurrences of a fluent are strongly negated or none is.
Note that such planning domains are not false-committed in general.
The security check SC2 also works for generalizations of serial planning domains.
For example, we may safely add rules r of the form caused false after B .
Furthermore, SC2 may also be profitably combined with SC1 in order to enlarge classes
for which security checking is supported.
4.3. Incomplete security checking
We may combine (fast) security checks which are sound and security checks which are
complete to obtain checks which return the correct answer if possible, and leave the answer
open otherwise. This is similar to the use of incomplete constraint solvers in constraint
programming, which return either “yes”, “no”, or “unknown” if queried about satisfiability
of a constraint; the obvious requirement is that the answer returned does not contradict the
correct result.
Suppose that we have a suite of security checks SC1, . . . ,SCn, where SC1, . . . , SCj , for
some j  n, are known to be sound for a class of planning domainsPD and SCk, . . . ,SCn,
for some k  n, are known to be complete for PD. Then, we can combine them to the
following test T :
T (P,P )=
{
“yes”, if SCi (P,P )= “yes”, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , j };
“no”, if SCi (P,P )= “no”, for some i ∈ {k, . . . , n};
“unknown”, otherwise.
Observe that in the “yes” case of T , SCi (P,P ) = “yes” must hold for all i ∈ {k, . . . , n},
and symmetrically in the “no” case that SCi (P,P )= “no”, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , j }; this can
be used for checking integrity of the sound respectively complete security checks involved.
Note that we can always use a dummy complete security check which reports “yes”
on every input. By merging the “unknown” case into the “no” case, we thus can combine
sound security checks SC1, . . . ,SCj to another, more powerful sound security check SC
for the class PD. In particular, if SC1, . . . ,SCj are known to exhaust all secure plans, then
SC is a sound and complete security check for PD.
To account for the results in this section, in addition to the command-line options
-FP, -FPopt, and -FPsec that we have seen in Section 2.3, DLVK provides three
further options controlling the security checking: -FPcheck=n where n ∈ {1,2} (which
correspond to SC1 and SC2 in the current implementation) selects a security check, while
-FPsoundcheck=n and -FPcompletecheck=n where n ∈ {1,2}, as above, can be
used to specify a security check known to be sound and complete, respectively, for the input
domain. The incorporation of further built-in security checks and support for user-defined
security checks is planned for the future.
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5. Comparison and experiments
In the following, we will compare DLVK with several state-of-the-art conformant
planning systems, and report about experimental results about the performance of the
system. The results presented here are mainly intended to give a momentary view on the
state of the current implementation of DLVK and its capabilities. To that end, we present
extensive benchmark results, and also compare the expressive power and flexibility of the
various systems.
5.1. Overview of compared systems
5.1.1. CCALC
The Causal Calculator (CCALC) is a model checker for the languages of causal theories
[30]. It translates programs in the action language C into the language of causal theories
which are in turn transformed into SAT problems using literal completion as described in
[31]. This approach is based on Satisfiability Planning [22], where planning problems are
reduced to SAT problems which are then solved by means of an efficient SAT solver like
SATO [48] or relsat [1].
Though its input language allows nondeterminism in the initial state and also
nondeterministic action effects, CCALC as such is not capable of conformant planning and
only computes “optimistic plans” (according to DLVK terminology). Plan length is fixed,
and both sequential and concurrent planning are supported.
CCALC is written in Prolog. For our tests, we used version 1.90 of CCALC which
we obtained from <URL:http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/cc/> and a trial version of
SICStus Prolog 3.8.6; we tested the system with SATO 3.2.1 and relsat 1.1.2. On the
instances SATO could solve it was significantly faster than relsat; relsat was used only
for the instances SATO could not solve in our experiments.
5.1.2. CMBP
The Conformant Model Based Planner [4] is based on the model checking paradigm
as well and relies on symbolic techniques such as BDDs. CMBP only allows sequential
planning. Its input language is an extension ofAR [16]. Unlike action languages such as C
or K, this language only supports propositional actions. Nondeterminism is allowed in the
initial state and for action effects. The length of computed plans is always minimal, but the
user has to declare an upper bound using command-line option -pl. If -pl is set equal to
the minimal plan length for the specific problem, this can be used to fix the plan length in
advance. We used this method to be comparable with DLVK which currently can only deal
with fixed plan length.
For our tests, we used CMBP 1.0, available at <URL:http://sra.itc.it/people/roveri/
cmbp/>.
5.1.3. CPlan
Introduced in [10,15], CPlan is a conformant planner based on CCALC and the C
action language [17,26,29]. This language is similar to K in many respects, but close to
classical logic, while K is more “logic programming oriented” by the use default negation
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(see [6] for further discussion). CPlan uses CCALC only to generate a SAT instance and
replaces the optional SAT-solvers used by CCALC with an own procedure that extracts
conformant plans from these SAT instances. CPlan implements full conformant planning
and supports the computation of both minimal length plans as well as plans of fixed length,
by incrementing plan length from a given lower bound until a plan is found or a given upper
bound is reached. We set the upper and lower bound equal to the minimal plan length of
the specific problems for our experiments to be comparable with DLVK. Sequential and
concurrent planning are possible; nondeterminism is allowed in the initial state as well as
for action effects.
For our tests, we used CPlan 1.3.0, which is available at <URL:http://frege.mrg.dist.
unige.it/∼otto/cplan.html>, together with CCALC 1.90 to produce the input for CPlan.
5.1.4. GPT
The General Planning Tool [3] employs heuristic search techniques like A∗ to search
the belief space. Its input language is a subset of PDDL. Nondeterminism is allowed in
the initial state as well as for action effects. GPT only supports sequential planning and
calculates plans of minimal length.
We used version GPT 1.14 obtained from <URL:http://www.cs.ucla.edu/∼bonet/
software/>.
5.1.5. SGP
In addition to conformant planning, Sensory Graphplan (SGP, [47]) can also deal with
sensing actions. SGP is an extension of the Graphplan algorithm [2]. Its input language
is an extension of PDDL [14]. Nondeterminism is allowed only in the initial state. The
program always calculates plans of minimal length.5 SGP does not support sequential
planning, but computes concurrent plans automatically recognizing mutually exclusive
actions. That means, minimal length plans in terms of SGP are not plans with a minimal
number of actions but with a minimal number of steps needed. At each step an arbitrary
number of parallel actions are allowed, as long as the preconditions or effects are not
mutually exclusive which is automatically detected by the algorithm.
SGP is written in LISP and available at <URL:http://www.cs.washington.edu/ai/sgp.
html>. For our tests, we used a trial version of Allegro Common Lisp 6.0.
5.1.6. Specific system features
We would also like to point out further specific features of some of these special purpose
planning systems:
• SGP automatically recognizes mutually exclusive actions in concurrent plans. It is
possible to encode concurrent plans in DLVK by explicitly describing the mutually
exclusive actions, as done in our encodings of the “bomb in the toilet” benchmark
problems for multiple toilets (see Section 5.2.2). However, the language K is more
5 SGP comprises the functionality of another system by Smith and Weld called CGP (Conformant Graphplan,
[42]), but is slower in general. As CGP is no longer maintained and not available online, we nevertheless decided
to choose SGP for our experiments.
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Table 1
Overview of system features
DLVK CCALC CPlan CMBP SGP GPT
Input language K C C AR PDDL PDDL
Sequential plans yes yes yes yes no yes
Concurrent plans yes yes yes no yes no
Optimistic plans yes yes no no no no
Conformant plans yes no yes yes yes yes
Minimal plan length no no yes yes yes yes
Fixed plan length yes yes yes noa no no
a An upper bound can be specified, but computed plans are always minimal.
complex than PDDL, which makes automatic recognition of possible conflicts of
actions much harder in our framework. On the other hand, our notions of executability
and nonexecutability allow more flexible encodings of parallel actions than SGP.
• GPT and SGP always compute minimal plans, which is not possible in the current
version of DLVK.
• CMBP and CPlan optionally compute minimal plans, where the user may specify
upper and/or lower bounds for the plan length.
Table 1 provides a comparison of DLVK and all the systems introduced above. Note
that CCALC is not capable of conformant planning, and thus we cannot use it on the
respective benchmark problems. On the other hand, CPlan showed slow performance on
the deterministic planning benchmarks that we considered. Therefore, we considered these
two systems in combination (CCALC for deterministic planning benchmarks and CPlan
for conformant planning benchmarks).
5.2. Benchmark problems and encodings
5.2.1. Blocksworld
For benchmarking we have chosen some blocks world instances to illustrate the
performance of DLVK on deterministic domains. Problems P1–P4 are due to [8], and
problem P5 is a slight modification of P4, which needs two moves more. The initial
configurations and the respective goal configurations of P1–P5 together with the minimum
number of moves (steps) needed to solve these problems are shown in Fig. 7.
5.2.2. Bomb in the toilet
To show the capabilities of DLVK on planning under incomplete information, and in
particular conformant planning, we have chosen the well-known “bomb in the toilet”
problem [34] and variations thereof, where we employ a naming convention due to [4].
The respective planning domain comprises actions with nondeterministic effects, the initial
state is incomplete and, in more elaborated versions, several actions are available that can
be done in parallel.
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Fig. 7. Blocksworld planning instances.
BT(p)—Bomb in the toilet with p packages. The basic scenario of the “bomb in the
toilet” problem is as follows. We have been alarmed that there is a bomb (exactly one) in
a lavatory. There are p suspicious packages which could contain the bomb. There is one
toilet bowl, and it is possible to dunk a package into it. If the dunked package contained
the bomb, then the bomb is disarmed and a safe state is reached. The obvious goal is to
reach a safe state via a secure plan.
BTC(p)—Bomb in the toilet with certain clogging. In a slightly more elaborated version,
dunking a package clogs the toilet, making further dunking impossible. The toilet can be
unclogged by flushing it. The toilet is assumed to be unclogged initially. Note that this
domain still comprises only deterministic action effects.
BTUC(p)—Bomb in the toilet with uncertain clogging. In a further elaboration of the
domain, dunking a package has a nondeterministic effect on the status of toilet, which is
either clogged or not clogged afterwards.
BMTC(p,t), BMTUC(p,t)—Bomb in the toilet with multiple toilets. Yet another elabora-
tion is that several toilet bowls (t  1, rather than just one) are available in the lavatory.
5.2.3. Encodings used
As far as possible, we used the original encodings which come along with the
distributions of the respective systems.
CCALC/CPlan. CCALC is not capable of conformant planning, while CPlan proved very
slow on deterministic domains. Thus, for the blocksworld problems P1–P5 we used the C
encoding provided by Esra Erdem with pure CCALC [8], while we used CPlan for the
“bomb in the toilet” problems, with slight modifications of the C encodings provided with
the current CPlan distribution.
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CMBP. For CMBP, we used the “bomb in the toilet” encodings which are included in the
distribution. BMTUC(p, t) is not included, but only a trivial modification of BMTC(p, t) is
needed to obtain an encoding for BMTUC. Because only propositional actions are allowed
in the input language of CMBP, an encoding of blocks world where many different moves
are possible is quite large. As no encoding is included in the examples, a (straightforward)
encoding of P1 which we used for comparison can be found in Section B.1 of Appendix B.
GPT. The distribution of GPT provides encodings for various “bomb in the toilet”
problems; BMTUC(p, t) was not included, but the respective extension of BTUC(p) is
trivial. For blocksworld, we used an adapted version of the SGP encoding, as the PDDL
dialects of the two systems slightly differ. The encoding for P1 can be found in the
appendix.
SGP. For SGP we used the blocks world and bomb in toilet encodings coming with the
distribution. BTUC(p) and BMTUC(p, t) cannot be encoded in SGP which only allows
nondeterminism in the initial state.
SGP generates concurrent plans, so we did not compare the sequential versions of
BT(p) and BMTC(p, t). Furthermore, for the blocks world problems, this means that the
minimal plan lengths differ from theK encodings, and we provide them in an extra column
of Table 2. Note that the number of actions in the plans computed by SGP is not necessarily
minimal. For example, for P3 a plan with 4 steps and 9 moves exists whereas SGP finds a
plan with 4 steps and 12 moves.
DLVK. We have tested for the “bomb in the toilet” problems two different encodings
in DLVK, developed in [6]. The first one, labeled ws in the results, mimics world-state
planning, in which the different completions of the states (“totalizations”) to world-states
are considered. The second one, labeled ks, uses the power of knowledge-state planning
provided by DLVK; it does not complete the states right away, but leaves the value of
unknown fluents open in accordance with the real knowledge of the planning agent about
the state of affairs. In both encodings, we first consider concurrent actions and then one
action at time.
Since the blocksworld problems are not conformant planning instances, we use
optimistic planning for them. For the knowledge-state encoding of the “bomb in the toilet”
problems, the applicability of the security check SC1 is straightforward even for BTUC(p)
and BMTUC(p, t), as the domains are mux-stratified w.r.t. the inertia rules for clogged
and -clogged, as these fluents do not occur in any bodies of other causation rules.
Furthermore, thanks to the knowledge-state representation, the domains are deterministic
and have unique initial states, so the security check is trivial and negligible for timing.
The world-state encodings of BT(p), BTC(p), and BMTC(p, t) are stratified, so the
security check SC1 is guaranteed to be sound and complete for these problems by
Corollary 4.2. In the case of BTUC(p) and BMTUC(p, t) in the world-state programs,
the macro total violates stratification. However, both BTUC(p) and BMTUC(p, t) are
false-committed domains, and thus the security check SC1 is sound and complete
for these problems by Theorem 4.5. Indeed, the respective programs have no cycle
with an odd number of negative arcs in their dependency graphs (cf. BMTUC(p, t) in
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Appendix C.1; BTUC(p, t) and BMTUC(p, t) have the same dependency graph, since
the only difference is that some fluents get an additional argument [6]), so by well-
known results at least one answer set is guaranteed, and thus condition (ii) of false-
committedness holds. Furthermore, the only constraints are those resulting from expanding
the nonexecutable statements. Since these constraints refer only to actions, either all
s′ in a transition 〈s,A, s′〉 satisfy them or no s′ does. Therefore, condition (i) of false-
committedness is enforced as well. The world-state encodings of “bomb in the toilet” are
not deterministic, so the security check is responsible for a considerable portion of the
timings.
5.3. Benchmark results and discussion
In this section, we compare the various systems in terms of representation capabilities
and run-time benchmarks.
5.3.1. Test environment
All tests were performed on a Pentium III 733 MHz machine with 256 MB of
main memory running SuSE Linux 6.4. The results for the blocks world problems are
summarized in Table 2. Tables 3–9 show the results for the various “bomb in the toilet”
problems. The minimal plan length is reported in the second column of each table. Note
that for CCALC the results include 1.23 s startup time for SICStus Prolog, while for SGP
0.27 s startup time is included. Run-times longer than 1200 CPU seconds were omitted,
which is indicated by a dash in the tables.
5.3.2. Representation
From the viewpoint of expressiveness, the languageK often allows a more compact and
readable encoding than AR or PDDL dialects: CMBP allows only propositional actions
(see Appendix B.1 for a blocks world encoding in AR), whereas languages like C and K
allow a much more elegant encoding of complex actions. PDDL dialects as used by GPT or
SGP, on the other hand, do not allow expressing ramifications which makes the encoding of
Table 2
Experimental results for blocksworld problems P1–P5
Problem Steps Blocks DLVK CCALC CMBP GPT SGP
steps/actionsa time
P1 4 4 0.04 s 1.73 s 0.18 s 1.13 s 3/4 9.69 s
P2 6 5 0.11 s 2.18 s 7.95 s 2.52 s 5/7 43.85 s
P3 8 8 8.81 s 5.42 s – – 4/12 248.45 s
P4 9 11 8.91 s 15.83 s – – – –
P5 11 11 21.14 s 350.43 sb – – – –
a As SGP supports only concurrent planning, the number of steps and number of actions for the solutions
found are displayed in an extra column. Note that the number of actions is not necessarily minimal.
b With CCALC and SATO no solution for P5 could be found, the timing for P5 was generated using relsat,
which is significantly slower on the other problem instances.
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Table 3
Experimental results for BT(p) with concurrent dunks
BT(p) Steps DLVK CPlan SGP
ws ks
BT(2) 1 0.01 s 0.01 s 1.38 s 0.69 s
BT(3) 1 0.02 s 0.01 s 1.38 s 0.80 s
BT(4) 1 0.01 s 0.01 s 1.39 s 0.95 s
BT(5) 1 0.02 s 0.01 s 1.42 s 1.21 s
BT(6) 1 0.02 s 0.01 s 1.47 s 1.55 s
BT(7) 1 0.02 s 0.01 s 1.56 s 2.00 s
BT(8) 1 0.02 s 0.01 s 1.79 s 2.56 s
BT(9) 1 0.01 s 0.02 s 2.29 s 3.32 s
BT(10) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 3.41 s 4.27 s
BT(11) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 6.04 s 5.34 s
BT(12) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 11.98 s 6.66 s
BT(13) 1 0.03 s 0.02 s 25.28 s 8.16 s
BT(14) 1 0.03 s 0.01 s 57.71 s 9.98 s
BT(15) 1 0.03 s 0.01 s 127.75 s 12.11 s
BT(16) 1 0.03 s 0.01 s 294.44 s 14.57 s
BT(17) 1 0.03 s 0.02 s 678.19 s 17.43 s
BT(18) 1 0.03 s 0.02 s – 20.74 s
BT(19) 1 0.03 s 0.02 s – 24.47 s
BT(20) 1 0.04 s 0.02 s – 28.78 s
Table 4
Experimental results for BT(p) sequential
T(p) Steps DLVK CPlan CMBP GPT
ws ks
BT(2) 2 0.02 s 0.02 s 1.37 s 0.03 s 0.56 s
BT(3) 3 0.03 s 0.02 s 1.39 s 0.04 s 0.55 s
BT(4) 4 0.11 s 0.02 s 1.39 s 0.04 s 0.61 s
BT(5) 5 1.50 s 0.03 s 1.45 s 0.04 s 0.61 s
BT(6) 6 28.78 s 0.03 s 1.81 s 0.04 s 0.63 s
BT(7) 7 593.15 s 0.03 s 5.12 s 0.05 s 0.67 s
BT(8) 8 – 0.05 s 65.85 s 0.06 s 0.68 s
BT(9) 9 – 0.06 s – 0.07 s 0.78 s
BT(10) 10 – 0.08 s – 0.10 s 0.95 s
BT(11) 11 – 0.10 s – 0.19 s 1.27 s
BT(12) 12 – 0.13 s – 0.39 s 2.12 s
BT(13) 13 – 0.16 s – 0.82 s 3.89 s
BT(14) 14 – 0.21 s – 1.76 s 8.87 s
BT(15) 15 – 0.28 s – 4.00 s 19.13 s
BT(16) 16 – 0.35 s – 8.82 s 42.17 s
BT(17) 17 – 0.47 s – 19.03 s 93.69 s
BT(18) 18 – 0.61 s – 38.95 s 208.00 s
BT(19) 19 – 0.78 s – 91.89 s 496.95 s
BT(20) 20 – 0.98 s – 199.63 s 546.43 s
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Table 5
Experimental results for BTC(p)
BTC(p) Steps DLVK CPlan CMBP GPT SGP
ws ks
BTC(2) 3 0.02 s 0.01 s 1.37 s 0.04 s 0.59 s 0.92 s
BTC(3) 5 0.08 s 0.02 s 1.39 s 0.04 s 0.60 s 3.30 s
BTC(4) 7 1.56 s 0.02 s 1.39 s 0.05 s 0.60 s 191.60 s
BTC(5) 9 36.28 s 0.03 s 2.36 s 0.05 s 0.62 s –
BTC(6) 11 – 0.04 s 28.95 s 0.06 s 0.66 s –
BTC(7) 13 – 0.06 s 178.97 s 0.07 s 0.68 s –
BTC(8) 15 – 0.08 s – 0.12 s 0.74 s –
BTC(9) 17 – 0.11 s – 0.21 s 0.81 s –
BTC(10) 19 – 0.14 s – 0.39 s 1.04 s –
BTC(11) 21 – 0.20 s – 0.81 s 1.48 s –
BTC(12) 23 – 0.26 s – 1.72 s 2.51 s –
BTC(13) 25 – 0.34 s – 3.79 s 4.68 s –
BTC(14) 27 – 0.45 s – 8.82 s 10.84 s –
BTC(15) 29 – 0.58 s – 16.92 s 23.31 s –
BTC(16) 31 – 0.74 s – 42.92 s 51.40 s –
BTC(17) 33 – 0.94 s – 92.03 s 114.21 s –
BTC(18) 35 – 1.17 s – 197.85 s 273.25 s –
BTC(19) 38 – 1.46 s – – 374.00 s –
BTC(20) 39 – 1.80 s – – – –
Table 6
Experimental results for BTUC(p)
BTUC(p) Steps DLVK CPlan CMBP GPT
ws ks
BTUC(2) 3 0.03 s 0.02 s 1.35 s 0.03 s 0.59 s
BTUC(3) 5 0.61 s 0.02 s 1.45 s 0.04 s 0.60 s
BTUC(4) 7 87.54 s 0.03 s 1.93 s 0.04 s 0.61 s
BTUC(5) 9 – 0.03 s 2.48 s 0.06 s 0.66 s
BTUC(6) 11 – 0.04 s – 0.06 s 0.65 s
BTUC(7) 13 – 0.05 s 51.72 s 0.07 s 0.74 s
BTUC(8) 15 – 0.08 s – 0.12 s 0.75 s
BTUC(9) 17 – 0.10 s – 0.20 s 0.88 s
BTUC(10) 19 – 0.14 s – 0.39 s 1.18 s
BTUC(11) 21 – 0.19 s – 0.80 s 1.81 s
BTUC(12) 23 – 0.25 s – 1.72 s 3.18 s
BTUC(13) 25 – 0.33 s – 3.79 s 6.42 s
BTUC(14) 27 – 0.43 s – 8.81 s 14.43 s
BTUC(15) 29 – 0.55 s – 16.94 s 32.25 s
BTUC(16) 31 – 0.71 s – 42.93 s 71.10 s
BTUC(17) 33 – 0.90 s – 92.02 s 159.53 s
BTUC(18) 35 – 1.15 s – 197.84 s 368.12 s
BTUC(19) 38 – 1.41 s – – –
BTUC(20) 39 – 1.74 s – – –
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Table 7
Experimental results for BMTC(p) with concurrent dunks
BMTC(p, t) Steps DLVK CPlan SGP
ws ks
BMTC(2,2) 1 0.02 s 0.01 s 1.41 s 0.95 s
BMTC(3,2) 3 0.04 s 0.02 s 1.50 s 3.40 s
BMTC(4,2) 3 0.11 s 0.03 s 1.72 s 7.17 s
BMTC(5,2) 5 2.79 s 0.04 s 3.37 s –
BMTC(6,2) 5 37.04 s 0.07 s 13.04 s –
BMTC(7,2) 7 – 0.52 s 71.50 s –
BMTC(8,2) 7 – 10.66 s – –
BMTC(9,2) 9 – 206.27 s – –
BMTC(10,2) 9 – – – –
BMTC(2,3) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 1.62 s 1.15 s
BMTC(3,3) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 2.31 s 1.76 s
BMTC(4,3) 3 0.08 s 0.03 s 4.81 s 15.01 s
BMTC(5,3) 3 0.35 s 0.03 s 13.55 s 76.28 s
BMTC(6,3) 3 17.81 s 0.06 s 43.34 s 592.41 s
BMTC(7,3) 5 223.31 s 0.13 s 210.71 s –
BMTC(8,3) 5 – 0.74 s 417.62 s –
BMTC(9,3) 5 – 5.90 s – –
BMTC(10,3) 7 – 389.08 s – –
BMTC(2,4) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 2.89 s 1.52 s
BMTC(3,4) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 9.19 s 2.34 s
BMTC(4,4) 1 0.03 s 0.02 s 37.55 s 3.71 s
BMTC(5,4) 3 0.18 s 0.04 s 158.74 s 372.74 s
BMTC(6,4) 3 5.29 s 0.05 s 571.77 s –
BMTC(7,4) 3 61.73 s 0.09 s – –
BMTC(8,4) 3 668.74 s 0.41 s – –
BMTC(9,4) 5 – 1.06 s – –
BMTC(10,4) 5 – 12.14 s – –
action effects less readable and elaboration tolerant (see Appendix B.2 for a GPT encoding
of blocksworld).
Similar remarks apply also to the “bomb in the toilet” problems, where K allows for
very compact and at the same time intuitive encodings.
5.3.3. Performance
The running times on blocksworld instances in Table 2 show that DLVK is significantly
faster than the other systems if there are many action instances.
Under the world-state encodings of the different “bomb in the toilet” instances, DLVK is
not competitive except for BT(p) with concurrent dunks, where plan length is always 1, and
BMTC(p). This indicates that DLVK’s performance is quite sensitive to (increasing) plan
length, especially for sequential planning. Still, DLVK outperforms SGP, a special purpose
planning system, on all comparable instances, and also CPlan (which is the system most
comparable to DLVK in terms of expressiveness and similar in nature) seems to be within
reach.
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Table 8
Experimental results for BMTC(p) sequential
BMTC(p, t) Steps DLVK CPlan CMBP GPT
ws ks
BMTC(2,2) 2 0.02 s 0.02 s 1.41 s 0.04 s 0.76 s
BMTC(3,2) 4 0.07 s 0.02 s 1.50 s 0.05 s 0.78 s
BMTC(4,2) 6 2.47 s 0.04 s 1.64 s 0.06 s 0.81 s
BMTC(5,2) 8 208.52 s 0.05 s 2.66 s 0.06 s 0.82 s
BMTC(6,2) 10 – 0.07 s 32.77 s 0.09 s 0.86 s
BMTC(7,2) 12 – 0.10 s 12.46 s 0.12 s 0.96 s
BMTC(8,2) 14 – 0.13 s – 0.23 s 1.11 s
BMTC(9,2) 16 – 0.20 s – 0.48 s 1.48 s
BMTC(10,2) 18 – 0.28 s – 0.96 s 2.26 s
BMTC(2,3) 2 0.02 s 0.02 s 1.50 s 0.04 s 0.76 s
BMTC(3,3) 3 0.03 s 0.02 s 1.85 s 0.04 s 0.81 s
BMTC(4,3) 5 1.84 s 0.03 s 2.86 s 0.06 s 0.84 s
BMTC(5,3) 7 291.24 s 0.06 s 5.92 s 0.09 s 0.90 s
BMTC(6,3) 9 – 0.09 s 14.50 s 0.14 s 0.99 s
BMTC(7,3) 11 – 0.25 s 40.41 s 0.30 s 1.17 s
BMTC(8,3) 13 – 15.42 s – 0.62 s 1.66 s
BMTC(9,3) 15 – – – 1.44 s 2.79 s
BMTC(10,3) 17 – – – 3.31 s 5.64 s
BMTC(2,4) 2 0.02 s 0.02 s 2.02 s 0.04 s 0.81 s
BMTC(3,4) 3 0.41 s 0.02 s 3.67 s 0.05 s 0.83 s
BMTC(4,4) 4 0.60 s 0.03 s 9.03 s 0.07 s 0.92 s
BMTC(5,4) 6 149.65 s 0.06 s 30.55 s 0.13 s 1.01 s
BMTC(6,4) 8 – 0.10 s – 0.23 s 1.27 s
BMTC(7,4) 10 – 0.15 s 199.73 s 0.51 s 1.85 s
BMTC(8,4) 12 – 0.47 s – 1.13 s 3.34 s
BMTC(9,4) 14 – 67.07 s – 2.94 s 7.18 s
BMTC(10,4) 16 – – – 6.38 s 17.34 s
Under the knowledge-state encodings, DLVK outperforms its competitors in many of the
chosen examples. The sensitivity to increasing plan length/search space can, however, also
partly be observed here, where execution times seem to grow drastically from one instance
to the next. This can be partly explained by the general heuristics of the underlying DLV
system, which might not scale up well in some cases. For instance, DLV as a general purpose
problem solver does not include special heuristics towards plan search. In particular,
during the answer set generation process, no distinction is made between actions and
fluents, which might be useful for planning tasks to control the generation of answer sets
respectively plans; this may be part of further investigations.
5.3.4. Effect of concurrent actions and default negation
Once we also consider concurrent actions (which are not supported by GPT and
CMBP), DLVK performs better than CPlan on some larger instances of BMTC(p, t) and
BMTUC(p, t) (see Tables 7 and 9).
Using the expressive power of default negation to express unknown fluents with the
knowledge-state encodings of “bomb in the toilet” inK pays off well: DLVK outperforms all
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Table 9
Experimental results for BMTUC(p) with concurrent dunks
BMTUC(p, t) Steps DLVK CPlan
ws ks
BMTUC(2,2) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 1.40 s
BMTUC(3,2) 3 0.11 s 0.03 s 2.06 s
BMTUC(4,2) 3 7.39 s 0.03 s 3.54 s
BMTUC(5,2) 5 – 0.04 s 8.18 s
BMTUC(6,2) 5 – 0.07 s 787.58 s
BMTUC(7,2) 7 – 0.80 s –
BMTUC(8,2) 7 – 23.57 s –
BMTUC(9,2) 9 – 818.23 s –
BMTUC(10,2) 9 – – –
BMTUC(2,3) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 1.55 s
BMTUC(3,3) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 10.27 s
BMTUC(4,3) 3 0.28 s 0.03 s 41.03 s
BMTUC(5,3) 3 34.09 s 0.03 s 181.45 s
BMTUC(6,3) 3 – 0.05 s 600.66 s
BMTUC(7,3) 5 – 0.10 s –
BMTUC(8,3) 5 – 0.74 s –
BMTUC(9,3) 5 – 9.55 s –
BMTUC(10,3) 7 – 693.99 s –
BMTUC(2,4) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 2.54 s
BMTUC(3,4) 1 0.02 s 0.02 s 119.18 s
BMTUC(4,4) 1 0.03 s 0.02 s 582.84 s
BMTUC(5,4) 3 0.84 s 0.04 s –
BMTUC(6,4) 3 748.90 s 0.05 s –
BMTUC(7,4) 3 – 0.08 s –
BMTUC(8,4) 3 – 0.55 s –
BMTUC(9,4) 5 – 0.98 s –
BMTUC(10,4) 5 – 17.89 s –
other systems, including the special purpose conformant planners GPT and CMBP, except
on sequential BMTC(p, t) and BMTUC(p, t) with more than two toilets (see Tables 8 and
10), where CMBP is fastest.
5.3.5. Summary of experimental results
Overall, the results indicate that DLVK is competitive with state of the art conformant
planners, especially when exploiting the K language features in terms of knowledge-state
problem encodings. Recall, however, that some of the systems compute minimal plans,
which is (currently) not supported by DLVK. The comparison of DLVK to CCALC/CPlan
is particularly relevant, since these systems are closest in spirit to DLVK. As we can
see, the advanced features of knowledge-state encoding lead to significant performance
improvements.
198 T. Eiter et al. / Artificial Intelligence 144 (2003) 157–211
Table 10
Experimental results for BMTUC(p) sequential
BMTUC(p, t) Steps DLVK CPlan CMBP GPT
ws ks
BMTUC(2,2) 2 0.02 s 0.02 s 1.39 s 0.04 s 0.78 s
BMTUC(3,2) 4 0.52 s 0.02 s 1.96 s 0.04 s 0.80 s
BMTUC(4,2) 6 264.20 s 0.04 s 3.37 s 0.05 s 0.81 s
BMTUC(5,2) 8 – 0.05 s 361.64 s 0.06 s 0.85 s
BMTUC(6,2) 10 – 0.07 s – 0.08 s 0.92 s
BMTUC(7,2) 12 – 0.10 s – 0.12 s 1.04 s
BMTUC(8,2) 14 – 0.14 s – 0.23 s 1.34 s
BMTUC(9,2) 16 – 0.21 s – 0.47 s 2.00 s
BMTUC(10,2) 18 – 0.27 s – 0.96 s 3.71 s
BMTUC(2,3) 2 0.02 s 0.02 s 1.49 s 0.04 s 0.79 s
BMTUC(3,3) 3 0.04 s 0.03 s 6.47 s 0.05 s 0.81 s
BMTUC(4,3) 5 71.03 s 0.04 s 22.07 s 0.06 s 0.86 s
BMTUC(5,3) 7 – 0.05 s 150.72 s 0.09 s 0.98 s
BMTUC(6,3) 9 – 0.08 s – 0.14 s 1.19 s
BMTUC(7,3) 11 – 0.21 s – 0.29 s 1.74 s
BMTUC(8,3) 13 – 13.39 s – 0.61 s 3.15 s
BMTUC(9,3) 15 – – – 1.45 s 6.69 s
BMTUC(10,3) 17 – – – 3.31 s 15.57 s
BMTUC(2,4) 2 0.01 s 0.02 s 1.93 s 0.04 s 0.79 s
BMTUC(3,4) 3 0.78 s 0.02 s 41.70 s 0.05 s 0.86 s
BMTUC(4,4) 4 5.81 s 0.04 s 182.92 s 0.07 s 0.97 s
BMTUC(5,4) 6 – 0.06 s 837.33 s 0.12 s 1.33 s
BMTUC(6,4) 8 – 0.09 s – 0.23 s 2.23 s
BMTUC(7,4) 10 – 0.13 s – 0.51 s 4.79 s
BMTUC(8,4) 12 – 0.42 s – 1.13 s 11.37 s
BMTUC(9,4) 14 – 64.02 s – 2.94 s 28.07 s
BMTUC(10,4) 16 – – – 6.37 s 68.26 s
6. Further related work and conclusion
We have discussed the relation of DLVK to a number of planning systems in Section 5
already, and complement this by briefly addressing further approaches and systems here.
6.1. Further related work
The idea to employ declarative logic programming systems for planning finds its roots
in the seminal paper Subrahmanian and Zaniolo [43], which carried out the idea of
satisfiability planning [22] to the framework of declarative logic programming.
Planning under incomplete knowledge has been widely investigated in the AI literature.
Most works extend algorithms/systems for classical planning, rather than using deduction
techniques for solving planning tasks as proposed in this paper. The systems Buridan [23],
UDTPOP [37], Conformant Graphplan [42], CNLP [38] and CASSANDRA [39] fall in
this class. In particular, Buridan, UDTPOP, and Conformant Graphplan can solve secure
planning (also called conformant planning) problems, like DLVK. On the other hand, the
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systems CNLP and CASSANDRA deal with conditional planning (where the sequence of
actions to be executed depends on dynamic conditions).
More recent works propose the use of automated reasoning techniques for planning
under incomplete knowledge. In [41] a technique for encoding conditional planning
problems in terms of 2-QBF formulas is proposed. The work in [11] proposes a technique
based on regression for solving secure planning problems in the framework of the Situation
Calculus, and presents a Prolog implementation of such a technique. In [31], sufficient
syntactic conditions ensuring security of every (optimistic) plan are singled out. While
sharing their logic-based nature, our work presented in this paper differs considerably from
such proposals, since it is based on a different formalism.
6.2. Summary
In this paper, we have presented the DLVK planning system, which implements the
K action and planning language, introduced and discussed in the companion paper [6],
on top of the DLV logic programming system. In the course of this, we have shown a
transformation of planning problems in K into logic programming. In particular, we have
given such a transformation for optimistic planning, which is planning in the traditional
sense, and we have discussed how secure planning, i.e., conformant planning, can be
realized for certain classes of planning problems via a transformation of security checking
into logic programming. Our transformations use disjunctions in rule heads supported by
DLV, but can be easily adapted to be disjunction-free, and thus become available for other
logic programming systems such as Smodels [35]. Furthermore, we have compared our
system on some standard benchmark problems to similar logic-based planning systems,
namely CCALC [30,31], CPlan [10,15], CMBP [4]), GPT [3], and SGP [47]. We obtained
promising performance results for secure planning exploiting the power of knowledge-state
problem encodings, which are a distinguishing feature of the K planning language. As we
believe, the results of the present paper show that knowledge-state encoding of planning
problems has, besides it conceptual conciseness and natural appeal, potential also from a
computational perspective.
6.3. Further and future work
Enhancing and further improving the DLVK planning system is an ongoing effort. There
are several issues which we address in our current and future research. One issue, discussed
more in detail in the companion paper [6], is the development of a methodology for
profitably using the knowledge-state planning approach.
Another issue concerns improvements and enhanced capabilities for secure planning.
We have performed further experiments with a different approach of conformant answer
set planning presented in [24]. In contrast to the plan security checking described here, that
paper sketches an integrated encoding of conformant planning domains. In that approach,
all answer sets correspond to secure plans and no further checking is necessary. These
results seem to be very encouraging, but it is only possible to encode a rather restricted
class of domains in DLV. In fact, since secure planning is P3 -complete [6], complexity
arguments show that this method can not be efficiently extended to all planning domains.
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On the other hand, security checking for all planning domains is in the class .P2 , and
thus can be polynomially encoded to DLV. However, such a transformation remains to be
designed in full generality. Besides these issues, also extended handling of incomplete
security checking, as described in this paper, is part of our research, and we consider further
built-in as well as support for user-defined security checks.
Finally, the use of the DLV engine as a computational backbone suggests to use its ca-
pabilities to enhance the DLVK planning system by further features. In particular, by the
use of weak constraints, it is possible to compute in DLV optimal answer sets of a logic
program. This provides a computational basis for determining optimal plans of a planning
problem, which are plans that minimize a given objective function, such as cost of actions,
or execution time. To our knowledge, current logic-based planning systems do not offer
comprehensive such capabilities. Enhancing the K language and the DLVK system for opti-
mal planning is on our agenda, and such features will be included in future DLVK releases.
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Appendix A. Definition of language K
This appendix contains, in shortened form, the definition of the languageK; see [6] for
more details and examples.
A.1. Basic syntax
We assume σ act, σ fl, and σ typ disjoint sets of action, fluent and type names, respectively,
i.e., predicate symbols of arity  0, and disjoint sets σcon and σvar of constant and
variable symbols. Here, σ fl , σ act describe dynamic knowledge and σ typ describes static
background knowledge. An action (respectively fluent, type) atom is of form p(t1, . . . , tn),
where p ∈ σ act (respectively, σ fl , σ typ) has arity n and t1, . . . , tn ∈ σcon ∪ σvar . An action
(respectively, fluent, type) literal l is an action (respectively, fluent, type) atom a or its
negation¬a, where “¬” (alternatively, “–”) is the true negation symbol. We define ¬.l = a
if l = ¬a and ¬.l = ¬a if l = a, where a is an atom. A set L of literals is consistent,
if L ∩ ¬.L = ∅. Furthermore, L+ (respectively, L−) is the set of positive (respectively,
negative) literals in L. The set of all action (respectively, fluent, type) literals is denoted
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as Lact (respectively, Lfl , Ltyp). Furthermore, Lfl,typ = Lfl ∪ Ltyp, Ldyn = Lfl ∪ L+act, and
L = Lfl,typ ∪L+act.
All actions and fluents must be declared using statements as follows.
Definition A.1 (Action, fluent declaration). An action (respectively, fluent) declaration, is
of the form:
p(X1, . . . ,Xn) requires t1, . . . , tm (A.1)
where p ∈ L+act (respectively, p ∈ L+fl ), X1, . . . ,Xn ∈ σvar where n  0 is the arity of p,
t1, . . . , tm ∈Ltyp, m 0, and every Xi occurs in t1, . . . , tm.
If m= 0, the keyword requires may be omitted. Causation rules specify dependen-
cies of fluents on other fluents and actions.
Definition A.2 (Causation rule). A causation rule (rule, for short) is an expression of the
form
caused f if b1, . . . , bk,not bk+1, . . . ,not bl
after a1, . . . , am,not am+1, . . . ,not an (A.2)
where f ∈ Lfl ∪ {false}, b1, . . . , bl ∈ Lfl,typ, a1, . . . , anL, l  k  0, and nm 0.
Rules where n= 0 are static rules, all others dynamic rules. When l = 0 (respectively,
n= 0), “if” (respectively, “after”) is omitted; if both l = n= 0,“caused” is optional.
We access parts of a causation rule r by h(r) = {f }, post+(r) = {b1, . . . , bk},
post−(r)= {bk+1, . . . , bl}, pre+(r)= {a1, . . . , am}, pre−(r)= {am+1, . . . , an}, and lit(r)=
{f,b1, . . . , bl, a1, . . . , an}. Intuitively, pre+(r) (respectively, post+(r)) accesses the state
before (respectively, after) some action(s) happen.
Special static rules may be specified for the initial states.
Definition A.3 (Initial state constraint). An initial state constraint is a static rule of the
form (A.2) preceded by “initially”.
The language K allows conditional execution of actions, where several alternative
executability conditions may be specified.
Definition A.4 (Executability condition). An executability condition e is an expression of
the form
executable a if b1, . . . , bk,not bk+1, . . . ,not bl (A.3)
where a ∈L+act and b1, . . . , bl ∈ L, and l  k  0.
If l = 0 (i.e., executability is unconditional), “if” is skipped. The parts of e are
accessed by h(e) = {a}, pre+(e) = {b1, . . . , bk}, pre−(e) = {bk+1, . . . , bl}, and lit(e) =
{a, b1, . . . , bl}. Intuitively, pre−(e) refers to the state at which some action’s suitability
is evaluated. Here, the state after action execution is not involved. For convenience, we
define post+(e)= post−(e)= ∅.
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All causal rules and executability conditions must satisfy the following condition, which
is similar to safety in logic programs [46]: Each variable in a default-negated type literal
must also occur in some literal which is not a default-negated type literal. No safety is
requested for variables appearing in other literals. The reason is that variables appearing in
fluent and action literals are implicitly safe by the respective type declarations.
Notation. For any causal rule, initial state constraint, and executability condition r and
ν ∈ {post,pre,b}, we define ν(r)= ν+(r)∪ ν−(r), where bs(r)= posts(r)∪ pres(r).
A.1.1. Planning domains and planning problems
Definition A.5 (Action description, planning domain). An action description 〈D,R〉
consists of a finite set D of action and fluent declarations and a finite set R of safe causation
rules, safe initial state constraints, and safe executability conditions. A K planning domain
is a pair PD = 〈Π,AD〉, where Π is a stratified Datalog program (the background
knowledge) which is safe (cf. [46]), and AD is an action description. We call PD positive,
if no default negation occurs in AD.
Definition A.6 (Planning problem). A planning problem P = 〈PD, q〉 is a pair of a
planning domain PD and a query q , i.e.,
g1, . . . , gm,not gm+1, . . . ,not gn ? (i) (A.4)
where g1, . . . , gn ∈ Lfl are variable-free, nm 0, and i  0 denotes the plan length.
A.2. Semantics
We start with the preliminary definition of the typed instantiation of a planning domain.
This is similar to the grounding of a logic program, with the difference being that only
correctly typed fluent and action literals are generated.
Let PD = 〈Π, 〈D,R〉〉 be a planning domain, and let M be the (unique) answer set of Π
[12]. Then, θ(p(X1, . . . ,Xn)) is a legal action (respectively, fluent) instance of an action
(respectively, fluent) declaration d ∈D of the form (A.1), if θ is a substitution defined over
X1, . . . ,Xn such that {θ(t1), . . . , θ(tm)} ⊆M . By LPD we denote the set of all legal action
and fluent instances. The instantiation of a planning domain respecting type information is
as follows.
Definition A.7 (Typed instantiation). For any planning domain PD = 〈Π, 〈D,R〉〉, its
typed instantiation is given by PD↓ = 〈Π↓, 〈D,R↓〉〉, where Π↓ is the grounding of Π
(over σcon) and R↓ = {θ(r) | r ∈ R, θ ∈9r}, where 9r is the set of all substitutions θ of
the variables in r using σcon, such that lit(θ(r))∩Ldyn ⊆ LPD ∪ (¬.LPD ∩L−fl ).
In other words, in PD↓ we replace Π and R by their ground versions, but keep of
the latter only rules where the atoms of all fluent and action literals agree with their
declarations. We say that a PD = 〈Π, 〈D,R〉〉 is ground, if Π and R are ground, and
moreover that it is well-typed, if PD and PD↓ coincide.
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A.2.1. States and transitions
Definition A.8 (State, state transition). A state w.r.t. a planning domain PD is any
consistent set s ⊆ Lfl ∩ (lit(PD) ∪ lit(PD)−) of legal fluent instances and their negations.
A state transition is any tuple t = 〈s,A, s′〉 where s, s′ are states and A⊆ Lact ∩ lit(PD) is
a set of legal action instances in PD.
Observe that a state does not necessarily contain either f or ¬f for each legal instance
f of a fluent, and may even be empty (s = ∅). State transitions are not constrained; this
will be done in the definition of legal state transitions below. We proceed in analogy to
the definition of answer sets in [12], considering first positive (i.e., involving a positive
planning domain) and then general planning problems.
In what follows, we assume that PD = 〈Π, 〈D,R〉〉 is a well-typed ground planning
domain and thatM is the unique answer set ofΠ. For any other PD, the respective concepts
are defined through its typed grounding PD↓.
Definition A.9 (Legal initial state). A state s0 is a legal initial state for a positive PD, if s0
is the least set (w.r.t. ⊆) such that post(c)⊆ s0 ∪M implies h(c)⊆ s0, for all initial state
constraints and static rules c ∈R.
For a positive PD and a state s, a set A ⊆ L+act is called executable action set w.r.t.
s, if for each a ∈ A there exists an executability condition e ∈ R such that h(e) = {a},
pre(e) ∩ Lfl,typ ⊆ s ∪ M , and pre(e) ∩ L+act ⊆ A. Note that this definition allows for
modeling dependent actions, i.e., actions which depend on the execution of other actions.
Definition A.10 (Legal state transition). Given a positive PD, a state transition t =
〈s,A, s′〉 is called legal, if A is an executable action set w.r.t. s and s′ is the minimal
consistent set that satisfies all causation rules w.r.t. s ∪A∪M . That is, for every causation
rule r ∈ R, if (i) post(r)⊆ s′ ∪M , (ii) pre(r)∩Lfl,typ ⊆ s ∪M , and (iii) pre(r)∩Lact ⊆A
all hold, then h(r) = {false} and h(r)⊆ s′.
This is now extended to general a well-typed ground PD containing default negation
using a Gelfond–Lifschitz type reduction to a positive planning domain [12].
Definition A.11 (Reduction). Let PD be a ground and well-typed planning domain, and let
t = 〈s,A, s′〉 be a state transition. Then, the reduction PDt = 〈Π, 〈D,Rt 〉〉 of PD by t is
the planning domain where Rt is obtained from R by deleting
(1) each r ∈R, where either post−(r)∩ (s′ ∪M) = ∅ or pre−(r)∩ (s ∪A∪M) = ∅, and
(2) all default literals not L (L ∈ L) from the remaining r ∈R.
Note that PDt is positive and ground. We extend further definitions as follows.
Definition A.12 (Legal initial state, executable action set, legal state transition). For any
planning domain PD, a state s0 is a legal initial state, if s0 is a legal initial state for
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PD〈∅,∅,s0〉; a set A is an executable action set w.r.t. a state s, if A is executable w.r.t. s
in PD〈s,A,∅〉; and, a state transition t = 〈s,A, s′〉 is legal, if it is legal in PDt .
A.2.2. Plans
Definition A.13 (Trajectory). A sequence of state transitions T = 〈〈s0,A1, s1〉, 〈s1,A2, s2〉,
. . . , 〈sn−1,An, sn〉〉, n 0, is a trajectory for PD, if s0 is a legal initial state of PD and all
〈si−1,Ai, si〉, 1 i  n, are legal state transitions of PD.
If n= 0, then T = 〈 〉 is empty and has s0 associated explicitly.
Definition A.14 (Optimistic plan). A sequence of action sets 〈A1, . . . ,Ai〉, i  0, is an
optimistic plan for a planning problem P = 〈PD, q〉, if a trajectory T = 〈〈s0,A1, s1〉,
〈s1,A2, s2〉, . . . , 〈si−1,Ai, si〉〉 exists in PD which establishes the goal, i.e., {g1, . . . , gm} ⊆
si and {gm+1, . . . , gn} ∩ si = ∅.
Optimistic plans amount to “plans”, “valid plans”, etc. as defined in the literature. The
term “optimistic” should stress the credulous view in this definition, with respect to incom-
plete fluent information and nondeterministic action effects. In such cases, the execution
of an optimistic plan P might fail to reach the goal. We thus resort to secure plans.
Definition A.15 (Secure plans (alias conformant plans)). An optimistic plan 〈A1, . . . ,An〉
is a secure plan, if for every legal initial state s0 and trajectory T = 〈〈s0,A1, s1〉, . . . , 〈sj−1,
Aj , sj 〉〉 such that 0 j  n, it holds that (i) if j = n then T establishes the goal, and (ii) if
j < n, then Aj+1 is executable in sj w.r.t. PD, i.e., some legal transition 〈sj ,Aj+1, sj+1〉
exists.
Note that plans admit in general the concurrent execution of actions. We call a plan
〈A1, . . . ,An〉 sequential (or non-concurrent), if |Aj | 1, for all 1 j  n.
A.3. Macros
K includes several macros as shorthands for frequently used concepts. Let a ∈ L+act
denote an action atom, f ∈ Lfl a fluent literal, B a (possibly empty) sequence b1, . . . , bk,
not bk+1, . . . ,not bl where each bi ∈ Lfl,typ, i = 1, . . . , l, and A a (possibly empty)
sequence a1, . . . , am, not am+1, . . . ,not an where each aj ∈ L, j = 1, . . . , n.
Inertia. To allow for an easy representation of fluent inertia, K provides
inertial f if B after A.
⇔ caused f if not ¬.f, B after f, A.
Defaults. A default value of a fluent can be expressed by the shortcut
default f. ⇔ caused f if not ¬.f.
It is in effect unless some other causation rule provides evidence to the opposite value.
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Totality. For reasoning under incomplete, but total knowledge K provides (f positive):
total f if B after A.
⇔ caused f if not -f, B after A.
caused -f if not f, B after A.
State integrity. For integrity constraints that refer to the preceding state, K provides
forbidden B after A. ⇔ caused false if B after A.
Nonexecutability. For specifying that some action is not executable, K provides
nonexecutable a if B. ⇔ caused false after a, B.
By this definition, nonexecutable overrides executable in case of conflicts.
Non-concurrent plans. To exclude simultaneous execution of actions, K provides
noConcurrency. ⇔ caused false after a1, a2.
where a1 and a2 range over all possible actions such that a1,a2 ∈ LPD ∩ Lact and
a1 = a2.
In all macros, “if B” (respectively, “after A”) can be omitted, if B (respectively, A)
is empty.
Appendix B. Problem encodings for other systems
B.1. Blocksworld problem P1 for CMBP
DOMAIN blocks_P1
ACTIONS
act : { move_1_4, move_1_3, move_1_2, move_1_0, move_2_4, move_2_3,
move_2_1, move_2_0, move_3_4, move_3_2, move_3_1, move_3_0,
move_4_3, move_4_2, move_4_1, move_4_0 };
FLUENTS
on_1 : 0..4; on_2 : 0..4; on_3 : 0..4; on_4 : 0..4;
blocked_1 : boolean; blocked_2 : boolean;
blocked_3 : boolean; blocked_4 : boolean;
INERTIAL on_1, blocked_1, on_2, blocked_2, on_3, blocked_3, on_4, blocked_4;
CAUSES act = move_1_4 FALSE IF blocked_1 | blocked_4;
CAUSES act = move_1_3 FALSE IF blocked_1 | blocked_3;
CAUSES act = move_1_2 FALSE IF blocked_1 | blocked_2;
CAUSES act = move_1_0 FALSE IF blocked_1;
CAUSES act = move_1_4 on_1 = 4 & blocked_4 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_1_4 !blocked_2 IF on_1 = 2;
CAUSES act = move_1_4 !blocked_3 IF on_1 = 3;
CAUSES act = move_1_3 on_1 = 3 & blocked_3 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_1_3 !blocked_2 IF on_1 = 2;
CAUSES act = move_1_3 !blocked_4 IF on_1 = 4;
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CAUSES act = move_1_2 on_1 = 2 & blocked_2 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_1_2 !blocked_3 IF on_1 = 3;
CAUSES act = move_1_2 !blocked_4 IF on_1 = 4;
CAUSES act = move_1_0 on_1 = 0 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_1_0 !blocked_2 IF on_1 = 2;
CAUSES act = move_1_0 !blocked_3 IF on_1 = 3;
CAUSES act = move_1_0 !blocked_4 IF on_1 = 4;
CAUSES act = move_2_4 FALSE IF blocked_2 | blocked_4;
CAUSES act = move_2_3 FALSE IF blocked_2 | blocked_3;
CAUSES act = move_2_1 FALSE IF blocked_2 | blocked_1;
CAUSES act = move_2_0 FALSE IF blocked_2;
CAUSES act = move_2_4 on_2 = 4 & blocked_4 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_2_4 !blocked_1 IF on_2 = 1;
CAUSES act = move_2_4 !blocked_3 IF on_2 = 3;
CAUSES act = move_2_3 on_2 = 3 & blocked_3 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_2_3 !blocked_1 IF on_2 = 1;
CAUSES act = move_2_3 !blocked_4 IF on_2 = 4;
CAUSES act = move_2_1 on_2 = 1 & blocked_1 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_2_1 !blocked_3 IF on_2 = 3;
CAUSES act = move_2_1 !blocked_4 IF on_2 = 4;
CAUSES act = move_2_0 on_2 = 0 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_2_0 !blocked_1 IF on_2 = 1;
CAUSES act = move_2_0 !blocked_3 IF on_2 = 3;
CAUSES act = move_2_0 !blocked_4 IF on_2 = 4;
CAUSES act = move_3_4 FALSE IF blocked_3 | blocked_4;
CAUSES act = move_3_2 FALSE IF blocked_3 | blocked_2;
CAUSES act = move_3_1 FALSE IF blocked_3 | blocked_1;
CAUSES act = move_3_0 FALSE IF blocked_3;
CAUSES act = move_3_4 on_3 = 4 & blocked_4 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_3_4 !blocked_1 IF on_3 = 1;
CAUSES act = move_3_4 !blocked_2 IF on_3 = 2;
CAUSES act = move_3_2 on_3 = 2 & blocked_2 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_3_2 !blocked_1 IF on_3 = 1;
CAUSES act = move_3_2 !blocked_4 IF on_3 = 4;
CAUSES act = move_3_1 on_3 = 1 & blocked_1 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_3_1 !blocked_2 IF on_3 = 2;
CAUSES act = move_3_1 !blocked_4 IF on_3 = 4;
CAUSES act = move_3_0 on_3 = 0 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_3_0 !blocked_1 IF on_3 = 1;
CAUSES act = move_3_0 !blocked_2 IF on_3 = 2;
CAUSES act = move_3_0 !blocked_4 IF on_3 = 4;
CAUSES act = move_4_3 FALSE IF blocked_4 | blocked_3;
CAUSES act = move_4_2 FALSE IF blocked_4 | blocked_2;
CAUSES act = move_4_1 FALSE IF blocked_4 | blocked_1;
CAUSES act = move_4_0 FALSE IF blocked_4;
CAUSES act = move_4_3 on_4 = 3 & blocked_3 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_4_3 !blocked_1 IF on_4 = 1;
CAUSES act = move_4_3 !blocked_2 IF on_4 = 2;
CAUSES act = move_4_2 on_4 = 2 & blocked_2 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_4_2 !blocked_1 IF on_4 = 1;
CAUSES act = move_4_2 !blocked_3 IF on_4 = 3;
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CAUSES act = move_4_1 on_4 = 1 & blocked_1 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_4_1 !blocked_2 IF on_4 = 2;
CAUSES act = move_4_1 !blocked_3 IF on_4 = 3;
CAUSES act = move_4_0 on_4 = 0 IF 1;
CAUSES act = move_4_0 !blocked_1 IF on_4 = 1;
CAUSES act = move_4_0 !blocked_2 IF on_4 = 2;
CAUSES act = move_4_0 !blocked_3 IF on_4 = 3;
INITIALLY on_1 = 0 & on_2 = 0 & on_3 = 0 & on_4 = 3 &
blocked_3 & !blocked_1 & !blocked_2 & !blocked_4;
CONFORMANT on_1 = 0 & on_2 = 1 & on_3 = 2 & on_4 = 3;
B.2. Blocks world problem P1 for GPT
(define (domain bw)
(:model SEARCH)
(:types BLOCK)
(:functions (on BLOCK BLOCK )
(clear BLOCK :boolean))
(:objects table - BLOCK)
(:action puton
:parameters ?X - BLOCK ?Y - BLOCK ?Z - BLOCK
:precondition (:and (= (on ?X) ?Z)
(= (clear ?X) true)
(:or (= (clear ?Y) true) (= ?Y table))
(:not (= ?Y ?Z))
(:not (= ?X ?Z))
(:not (= ?X table)))
:effect
(:set (on ?X) ?Y)
(:set (clear ?Z) true)
(:set (clear ?Y) false)))
(define (problem p1)
(:domain bw)
(:objects b0 b1 b2 b3 - BLOCK)
(:init
(:set (on b0) table)
(:set (on b1) table)
(:set (on b2) table)
(:set (on b3) b2)
(:set (clear b0) true)
(:set (clear b1) true)
(:set (clear b2) false)
(:set (clear b3) true)
(:set (clear table) false))
(:goal (:and (= (on b3) b2)
(= (on b2) b1)
(= (on b1) b0)
(= (on b0) table))))
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Appendix C. DLVK encodings of BMTUC(p, t)
C.1. World-state encoding
Background knowledge:
package(1). package(2). ... package(p).
toilet(1). toilet(2). ... toilet(t).
DLVK program:
fluents : clogged(T) requires toilet(T).
armed(P) requires package(P).
unsafe.
actions : dunk(P,T) requires package(P), toilet(T).
flush(T) requires toilet(T).
always : inertial armed(P).
inertial clogged(T).
caused -clogged(T) after flush(T).
caused -armed(P) after dunk(P,T).
total clogged(T) after dunk(P,T).
caused unsafe if armed(P).
executable flush(T).
executable dunk(P,T) if not clogged(T).
nonexecutable dunk(P,T) if flush(T).
nonexecutable dunk(P,T) if dunk(P1,T), P<> P1.
nonexecutable dunk(P,T) if dunk(P,T1), T<> T1.
initially : total armed(P).
forbidden armed(P), armed(P1), P<> P1.
forbidden not unsafe.
In this encoding, weak negation of the fluent clogged is a CWA representation of the
negated fluent -clogged, which relieves us from storing negative information explicitly.
The possible world-states are encoded (1) via the total-statement for the fluent
armed in the initially section, which generates all possible initial states, and (2)
via the total-statement for the fluent clogged in the always section, which specifies
the effect of dunking a package.
C.2. Knowledge-state encoding
Background knowledge:
package(1). package(2). ... package(p).
toilet(1). toilet(2). ... toilet(t).
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DLVK program:
fluents : clogged(T) requires toilet(T).
armed(P) requires package(P).
dunked(T) requires toilet(T).
unsafe.
actions : dunk(P,T) requires package(P), toilet(T).
flush(T) requires toilet(T).
always : inertial -armed(P).
inertial clogged(T) if not dunked(T).
inertial -clogged(T) if not dunked(T).
caused dunked(T) after dunk(P,T).
caused -clogged(T) after flush(T).
caused -armed(P) after dunk(P,T).
caused unsafe if not -armed(P).
executable flush(T).
executable dunk(P,T) if -clogged(T).
nonexecutable dunk(P,T) if flush(T).
nonexecutable dunk(P,T) if dunk(P1,T), P<> P1.
nonexecutable dunk(P,T) if dunk(P,T1), T<> T1.
initially : -clogged(T).
In this encoding, the fluents armed and clogged are treated as three-valued. Instead
of encoding all possible initial world states by cases, we have a single initial state in which
we only know that all toilets are not clogged, while the values of the fluents armed are
open. We may gain, on the one hand, knowledge on fluent armed by executing an action
flush, while on the other hand, we may lose (“forget”) information on fluent clogged,
if we know that something has been dunked into the respective toilet (for his projection,
we use the auxiliary fluent dunked).
An advantage of this encoding is that optimistic and secure plans coincide on this
encoding, since nondeterministic effects of action dunk are treated by “forgetting” the
value of the respective fluent clogged. We point out that the “bomb in toilet problem” is
per se computationally easy; so it seems that encodings based on world-states artificially
bloat this problem, because of their lack of a natural statement about fluents being unknown
in some state. For further discussion, we refer to [6].
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